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Section 1:  
Introduction 
 
 
At the beginning of transition many experts, based on the high level of 
industrial development, forecasted the rosy prosperity for Ukraine’s 
economy.  As soon as Ukraine has broken the records in hyperinflation and 
deepness of economic decline for the country not involved into the military 
conflict, the very same experts started to blame everyone for the obvious 
collapse of the economy.  Among the culprits the following ones were 
named: 
• Russia (for increase of the energy prices and the policy of 
discrimination for the Ukrainian goods ); 
• reformers (for poorly designed reforms);  
• communist nomenklatura (for the opposition to these reforms); and 
finally 
• the Western world – for the imposition of the economic and societal 
models allegedly alien to Ukraine, and for insufficient financial aid, 
etc. 
The Ukrainian government was remarkably inert comparing to its Central 
European or even Russian colleagues.  It reacted to the challenges in the 
case of emergency but hardly initiated the reforms by itself.  While the 
government was hesitating with the market reforms that should allow an 
invisible hand to operate, the bureaucracy was pretty active in imposing the 
discretional and discretionally enforced regulations, hence strengthening 
the grabbing hand of the nomenklatura and its allies.  As a result, the 
reforms were gravely slow and inconsistent.   
Meanwhile the majority of population were seeking hard the ways to 
survive, adapt and compete in the new, and not at all friendly, environment.  
Some of those people have chosen the way of independence and fair 
competition, often the hard work abroad, whereas other have taken the 
habitual way of paternalism and rent seeking.  The former seemed to be 
numerous, but the latter seemed to be more powerful.  While the former tried 
hard to adapt to the market competition, the latter distorted the emerging 
market in their own interests using the state as a tool.  It is worth noting that 
both categories were united in the attitude to the state: the former hated it 
because it obstructed their free market activity by allowing the state capture 
by vested interests; the latter despised it for its docility and “undersupporting” 
of their activities.  However, the admitted weakness of the state in transition 
by no means was a synonym to the weakness of the state bureaucracy in 
Ukraine.  On the contrary, the state bureaucracy was and remains the main 
player in the economy and politics.  Typically, not the predatory businessmen 
exploit poor bureaucrats; rather the state officials use crony business to 
convert their administrative discretionary power into rents, although both 
have descended from the same nomenklatura, so one can hardly distinguish 
the leader and the follower in this predatory duet.  They have to be regarded 
as just two grabbing hands of the same state captured by rent seeking 
nomenklatura. 
The rent seeking was deeply inherited into the Soviet system based on the 
soft budget constraints and economy of favors.  It did not shrink at the 
same rate as the sources of rent for the country dwindled.  Initially, up to 
the 1994, Russian suppliers charged low prices for energy.  But it did not 
benefit the Ukrainian economy as someone too naive could, perhaps, 
expect.  The cheap Russian energy became a source of rent income for 
both the government officials and privileged firms with good connections to 
the government.  It allowed for the postponement of reforms and, at the 
same time, diverted efforts of business away from the value creation.  In 
1994 this soft pricing was ceased.  But the government did it worst for the 
economy by protecting Ukrainian energy intensive industries with soft 
crediting that was converted into the rapidly growing state foreign debt 
(hence, forced international crediting).  Later on, barter deals and mutual 
offsets – the habitual ways of transactions under the “economy of favors” – 
were chosen for the price discrimination between privileged and non-
privileged energy customers.  Hence, the existing entities, whatever weak, 
were protected at the expense of more capable ones by the means of “virtual 
economy”.  As a result, due to the institutional reasons the highly vulnerable 
energy intensive sector was not merely preserved, but was expanded 
making Ukraine even more dependent from the Big Brother.  At the same 
time, the government has found yet another, quite unusual, source of a short-
term rent.  Ukraine followed Russia’s bad example in financing the budget 
deficit (caused by the economic inefficiency and unwillingness to eliminate 
soft budget constraints) with Ponzi-like T-bills game in 1996-1998 (August).1  
And the traditional way of rent seeking through the fiscal (export and import 
rents, subsidies, etc.) and monetary (currency devaluation) channels surely 
remained notable for all the observed period.   
Lack of necessary reforms and crowding out of a value creating activity 
were the obvious outcomes of such policies.  During all transition period the 
structure of the economy, and, particularly, of exports, has been worsening.  
The share of raw materials (the production of which was doubtfully value 
                                                 
1  Of course, such a borrowing is not a source of rent in its traditional definition, but under 
certain circumstances can be regarded similarly.  The fact that the cash flows from the T-bills 
market were accounted as the budget revenues (with no distinction to the tax ones) can be 
regarded as an indirect evidence for that.  We consider this issue in Section 3. 
adding) tended to increase over time, while the high-effort manufacturing 
contracted.  Paradoxically, the heavily subsidized energy intensive bulk 
commodities played the same role as the exportable raw materials do in 
the traditional models of Dutch disease.  In addition, T-bills with incredible 
discounts served as a sort of bestseller export commodity.  To complete 
the striking similarity with Dutch disease, after a rapid disinflation the real 
exchange rate started to appreciate, so Ukrainian final goods became 
noncompetitive even domestically.  But instead of exhausting the natural 
resources, the “trust resource” – a blank credit history of the newly 
independent country – was used by the ruling circles.  This peculiar game 
should clearly have been ended sooner or later, and for Ukraine the X-day 
could be expected to come in November 1998. 
In fact, the crisis came two months earlier.  Ukraine was bypassed by 
Russia that announced a default in August, allowing Ukraine to make the 
“soft” restructuring of her debt and escape the sound default.  So, Ukraine 
has in fact benefited from the Russian default per se, although she has 
been affected by other consequences of the world financial crisis, mostly by 
the fall in the energy prices and 4-fold depreciation of the ruble.  
Paradoxically, for the energy scarce Ukraine, the effect of increasing world 
oil prices was not severe due to semi-fixed prices charged by Russian 
monopolies toward their Ukrainian customers, which made the production 
costs of the latter relatively stable although still quite high; and the capacity 
(demand for Ukrainian goods) of the Russian market that was positively 
correlated with oil prices.  However, the main cause of a sharp economic 
decline in the fall of 1998 was not the collapse of the Russian market, as 
for other CIS countries, but (1) the leap in competitiveness of the Russian 
ferrous metal and chemical exporters which outperformed their Ukrainian 
competitors due to the depreciated ruble and cheap energy, and (2) the 
severe restrictions at the currency market that were in place for too long.    
Meanwhile, in a few months, right after these restrictions were abandoned, 
economy has started to grow at a strikingly high rate.  Is this the long-awaited 
sustainable growth, driven by the revelation of the great human potential – in 
1997 Ukraine was rated as #2 in the world by the number of patents/GDP 
ratio (Table 1)?  Or just a temporary boom driven by the boost in, the very 
volatile, world demand for the secondary raw materials – metal, mineral and 
chemistry products that constitute 66.2 percent of Ukraine’s exports?  What 
indeed prevents Ukraine from the disclosure of its human and productive 
potential – is it primarily market or the government failure?  And by what 
extent this potential does exist indeed?  Which institutional factors have 
determined the observed way of development?  Why the Ukrainian elite 
resisted reforms so badly instead of finding new ways to the competitive 
market economy and seeking political support from the population?  Which 
policy is needed for achieving sustainable economic growth in Ukraine?  
And, last but not least, is the government able to conduct the appropriate 
policies? 
This book seeks answers to these questions.  We analyze the reasons for 
Ukraine’s embarrassing economic performance over most of the last 
decade; provide explanations for a long-awaited recent economic recovery, 
and contemplate about the future economic prospects.   
The reminder of the book is organized as follows.  Section 2 concentrates 
on such major determinants of economic growth in transition as initial 
conditions, macroeconomic policy, structural reforms, and institutional 
environment.  What is the contribution of the above factors to explaining 
Ukraine’s economic performance over the last decade?  To what extent and 
why the transition experience of Ukraine is different from that of Russia, Latin 
America and other countries undergoing economic transformation?  This 
section of the book provides some answers to these questions and serves as 
the basis for a deeper analysis of the Ukraine’s transition experience that 
follows later in the book. 
Section 3 identifies the main problems hindering economic performance of 
Ukraine.   
Subsection 3.1 analyzes the institutional and behavioral problems, 
comprising of the elite’s non-preparedness to conduct structural reforms 
and their inherited from the Soviet times overconfidence in the vast natural 
resources.  As natural resources in a broader sense we may consider 
human capital, unlimited patience of population and its ability for 
readjustment in times of hardship.  The partial and asymmetric institutional 
reform resulted in a highly distorted economic structure, dominated by the 
old Soviet-era enterprises.  The elite lacked the capacity and willingness to 
promote initiation and expansion of the new competitive businesses.   
Subsection 3.2 describes overindustrialization, the curse of the Ukrainian 
economy.  Industrial lobby supported employment and the volume of output 
at the high social cost.  This inhibited market exit of loss-makers.   
Section 3.3 focuses on the rent-seeking activity, which has a re-distribution 
nature, in the energy and energy intensive industries with the government as 
a major instrument of rent seeking.  This is Ukraine’s specific feature, which 
hardly can be found elsewhere.  At the same time, unlike Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Ukraine lacked the easy sources (export of 
energy resources) of income, which could partially compensate the social 
costs associated with transition.  We also consider among rents the wasted 
domestic and external borrowing, which was actually spent on withholding of 
structural changes, first of all, bankruptcies of large insolvent enterprises.  
These enterprises are treated more favorably than the other economic 
agents. 
Subsection 3.4 examines the factors that contributed to the creation of the 
unfriendly business environment.  It analyzes numerous barriers for local 
and foreign entrepreneurs to do business in Ukraine.   
Section 4 presents empirical facts on and evidences of the patterns of 
Ukraine’s transition.  After restoring independence in order to pacify 
bureaucracy and gain enormous rents the authorities preferred to maintain 
the status-quo, which led to the preservation of old inefficient Soviet-style 
bureaucratic machine slightly colored by new rhetoric and renaming.  
Creation of new institutions and business culture was hindered by an 
extensive administrative intervention and excessive and unstable 
regulation.  Another confirmation of the government failure is poor contract 
and law enforcement, and absence of real bankruptcy, although the 
number of law enforcement employees and expenditures on their activity 
has increased.  The government failure to carry out transformations 
effectively and at a rapid rate resulted in flourishing ugly forms of transition 
such as soft budget constraints and non-monetary means of payments.  
The behavior of the most flexible resource – the labor force - in times of 
transition is also analyzed here. 
Section 5 considers the effects of the Asian and, especially, of the Russian 
financial crises as a turning point for depletion of the short-term rents and 
creation of stimulus for conducting the real changes in the economy.  It 
analyzes the recent economic recovery in Ukraine.   
Section 6 is devoted to the assessment of the potential for the creation of the 
new institutional environment and medium-term growth.  We consider three 
scenarios: pessimistic, baseline, and the optimistic one.  This section is not a 
macroeconomic forecast but rather an evaluation of the comparative 
advantages of Ukraine, first and foremost, of her human capital, depending 
on the rate of elimination of the political impediments for growth. 
Section 7 summarizes main findings and suggests directions for future 
research. 
 
Section 2:  
Overview of the main features of the 
Ukrainian transition experience in 
comparison with ”new” transition countries 
(Central Europe and Russia) and “old” 
transition countries (Latin America) 
 
 
A literature on the determinants of economic growth in transition generally 
concentrates on such major factors as initial conditions, macroeconomic 
policy, structural reforms, and institutional environment.  What is the 
contribution of the above factors to explaining Ukraine’s economic 
performance over the last decade?  To what extent and why the transition 
experience of Ukraine is different from that of other countries undergoing 
economic transformation?  This section of the book provides some answers 
to these questions and serves as the basis for a deeper analysis of 
Ukraine’s transition experience that follows later in the book. 
 
Initial conditions 
A strong effect of initial conditions on economic performance during the 
transition, especially at its early stage, is identified in many studies 
(Castanheira and Popov, 2000; De Melo et al.1997, Guriev and Ickes, 
2000, Havrylyshyn et al., 1999).  However, the magnitudes of inherited 
distortions and the impact of initial conditions on economic growth were far 
from being universal across countries. 
There are many reasons to believe that a number of structural and 
institutional factors made Ukraine’s initial position less favorable than that of 
other transition countries.  However, a number of legacies can well turn into 
advantages under a thoughtful government policy.  We describe some pros 
and cons of Ukrainian initial conditions below, and compare Ukrainian 
legacies with those faced by Russia and Latin America.   
At the start of the transition Ukraine had the highest share of large-scale 
industrial enterprises and was the second largest (after Russia) industrial 
producer in per capita terms among the CIS countries.2  With 3 percent of 
the USSR territory and 18 percent of its population Ukraine produced 16.7 
percent of the USSR industrial output.  For comparison, Russia had 61.9 
                                                 
2  Latvia and Lithuania had slightly higher industrial output per capita than Ukraine (but lower 
than Russia).  However, the industrial structure of these states was more consumer-oriented 
as compared to that of Ukraine, which gave them an advantage during the transition. 
percent in the USSR industrial output with 76 percent and 51 percent in its 
territory and population respectively.3 (more in Subsection 3.2) Such 
structure of the economy made Ukraine more vulnerable to the process of 
economic transformation than any other (with the exception of, perhaps, 
Russia) country of the FSU.  However, the major problem was caused not 
even by the fact that deindustrialization and the changing industrial 
structure entailed high costs in terms of output contraction and shedding of 
the labor force.  As we argue further, the key consequence of 
overindustrialization in Ukraine was creation of the powerful industrial lobby 
making its best to retard any effort of market-oriented reforms in order to 
preserve the existing sources of rents.  It is argued (Economic Reform…, 
2000) that it is more difficult to get any legislation through the Ukrainian 
Parliament than to do so through the Russian Duma because of the very 
fragmented nature of the former (making it difficult to buy the necessary 
number of the “right” votes).  However, if reforms do not touch the business 
interests of members of the Parliament, and are supported by request from 
the Presidential Administration, the Parliament members will vote even for 
the Land Code. 
The creation of Ukraine’s industrial sector, non-competitive worldwide, 
reminds Latin America in 1960-1970s.  The Latin American governments 
have experimented with policy of import substitution too long, which led to 
the inefficient resource allocation, stagnation of exports of manufacturing 
goods, agricultural decline and chronic negative balances of payments.  
The Latin American model of development, dating from the 1950s, calls for 
the government intervention in a number of main sectors, including 
manufacturing, in order to accelerate development.  For many state 
enterprises, however, “political considerations interfered with economic 
management, budgets were overspent, and the market was not available to 
discipline behavior.  The results were often disappointing, with many 
inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) draining public finance” 
(Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1996).   
The prevalence of loss-making energy-intensive sectors in the industrial 
structure of Ukraine made the economic situation in the country after the 
restoring independence quite difficult due to a high reliance on energy 
resources.  While Russia accounted for 91 percent of the total ex-USSR oil 
production, the share of Ukraine was a mere 0.9 percent.  That clearly 
made two highly industrialized economies face different perspectives after 
becoming independent states.  At the time when Russia could take 
advantage of rising world prices on energy products, Ukraine became 
highly dependent on energy resources and was subject to large terms-of-
trade shocks.  About 60 percent of Ukraine’s demand for fuel is satisfied 
                                                 
3  Karasik T. (1997), “USSR facts and figures annual, 17”, p. 154. 
through imports, including, 100 percent of nuclear fuel, 77 percent of the 
natural gas, 15 percent of coal and more than 85 percent of oil.  The main 
energy supplies come from Russia and Turkmenistan.   
There is a large body of growth literature suggesting that resource 
abundance can be associated with more problems for the economy than 
resource scarcity.  Indeed, the growth performance of many resource-rich 
Latin American countries is far from being convincing (Rodriguez and 
Sachs, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 1995).  “From 1963 to 1996, Venezuela 
sold USD 329 billion (in constant 1995 U.S.  dollars) of fuel exports to the 
world – USD 20,420 per Venezuelan.  However, in 1997 Venezuela’s GDP 
was 8 percent lower than in 1963” (Rodriguez, 2000).  In Tornell and Lane 
(1994) it was proposed that resource booms could lead to an expansion of 
rent-seeking activities. 
In the Ukrainian context, one could at least expect that a lack of energy 
resources would result in a faster restructuring of energy-intensive 
enterprises, introduction of the energy-saving technologies and generally 
limited opportunities for the energy-related rents.  The Ukrainian 
experience is indeed unique in that nothing of the above has happened.  
The government policy of energy subsidies to industrial producers 
conducted under the pressure of rent-seeking industrial lobby provided little 
incentives for enterprises to adopt energy-saving technologies and diverted 
away a large chunk of state resources that could be alternatively used for 
the benefit of the economy.  Moreover, having very limited resources for 
accumulating export rents a number of businessmen supported by high-
ranking government officials engaged in a dirty game of importing energy 
from Russia at below the world market prices and under the state 
guarantees to pay, and selling it abroad.  Needless to say that as a result of 
such operations the state was left with huge external debts to pay (at the 
expense of pension and wage arrears and/or the placement of T-bills and 
Eurobonds at the exorbitant rates) while the declining economy was further 
stripped off.  The problem of rent seeking will be discussed in a greater 
detail in Subsection 3.3 as it obviously plays a crucial role in explaining 
Ukraine’s poor performance. 
In 1990, one-third of Ukraine’s GDP was produced by the military-industrial 
complex (MIC).  Declining defense orders and worsened, after the breakup of 
the USSR, links with producers and end-users of Ukrainian components, led 
to the reduction of the size of the MIC.  A total labor force in this sector 
declined from 2.7 million people in 1990 to 1 million people in 2000.  The 
Pivdenmash plant in Dnipropetrovsk, the world’s largest rocket missile 
factory has experienced the reduction in labor force from 50,000 people in 
1991 to 10,000 today.  It is a subject to severe competition from Russia and 
the West, and a search of new sales markets and contracts is crucial for its 
survival.  The predominance of industry in the economy is generally 
associated with scientific knowledge and highly skilled labor force.  High 
quality of human capital in Ukraine can be clearly seen as a positive legacy 
of the Soviet era.  However, to deliver the benefits for the economy these 
skills need to have application in the new market economy, otherwise they 
become obsolete.  In Ukraine, job destruction up to date was far exceeding 
job creation leading to a negative employment growth rate and degradation 
of skills for those who became unemployed, or, in a depressed labor market, 
assumed jobs not related to their main training and specialization.  In these 
circumstances it is only the orientation toward skill-intensive production that 
can provide a solution. 
Ukraine inherited the most fertile land in Europe (30 percent of  
the world’s black soils).  The estimates of total value of agricultural land – 
arguably the country’s single most important natural resource – vary from 
over USD 35 billion by (OAB, 28/02/2000) to USD 70 billion, according to the 
Ukrainian specialists (Harbuz, 2001).  Agriculture has traditionally been one 
of the largest and most important sectors in the Ukrainian economy.  With a 3 
percent of the ex-USSR territory Ukraine generated one-fourth of the total 
agricultural output.  Having a historical reputation of a European granary 
(Havrylyshyn, 1999), Ukraine, paradoxically, had to import 1 million ton of 
food wheat in 2000 (OAB, 29/09/2000).  The 1999 harvest was the worst 
since 1945!  It is clear that the three consecutive years (1998-2000) of bad 
harvest cannot be blamed on unfavorable weather conditions.  The sector’s 
declining performance obviously has deep-rooted structural problems as its 
explanation (to be considered further).   
Actually, it reminds shortage of food in Argentina in mid-1940s, where meat 
and wheat comprise the main exports, as well as that in Brazil and Mexico.  
This was explained by a low productivity of agriculture and semi-feudal 
nature of large agricultural enterprises, which resemble the recently 
dissolved Ukrainian collective farms. 
 
 
Macroeconomic policy 
There is an increasing recognition in the growth literature that 
macroeconomic stabilization, which usually assumes low budget deficit, low 
inflation and stable exchange rate, is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for economic growth (Berg et al., 1999; Fischer et al., 1996).  If 
anything, the evidence indicates that it is only inflation above some 
threshold level that hurts growth (Havrylyshyn et al., 1999; Christoffersen 
and Doyle, 2000).   
The fact that in several transition economies the success in curbing 
inflation was not followed by growth recovery suggests that monetary 
stabilization itself is void for growth.  Ukraine can be cited as a good but 
very bitter example here.  After having the highest inflation rate among 
transition countries in 1993 (10,155 percent)4, Ukraine managed to depress 
inflation to 10 percent in 1997 and kept it below the CIS average since 
then.  However, despite this relative success in implementing 
macroeconomic discipline, the output was continuously declining until year 
2000.  These developments indicate clearly that economic recovery and 
sustainable growth are not possible if monetary discipline is not supported 
by profound changes in the institutional environment in which the firms 
operate.  As soon as the soft budget constraints (SBC) were not eliminated, 
open subsidies were just substituted by the hidden ones and the “virtual 
economy” has emerged.   
Latin America has also experienced high inflation times.  During 1960-1997 
inflation averaged 105.7 percent, which was far above average in all 
world’s regions except “new transition” economies (World Bank, 1997).  
There are only seven countries in which the average inflation rate 
exceeded 100 percent over the period from 1971 to 1997; five of them 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru) are in Latin America 
(Rodriguez, 2000).  The results obtained in (Rodrik, 1998) suggest that 
Latin American combination of high inequality and poor institutions is one of 
the key factors behind its problems in achieving low inflation. 
In Ukraine, unfavorable institutional climate did not prevent the restoration 
of relative macroeconomic stability, but this stability was of a little help as 
structural reforms were stalled. 
 
Structural reforms 
The growing evidence suggests that structural reforms play a key role in 
determining growth outcomes (Berg et al., 1999; Christoffersen and Doyle, 
2000; Havrylyshyn et al., 1999).  The experience of Latin America and CEE 
countries suggests that it is the success with implementation of structural 
reforms that largely determines the long-run economic performance, 
although the initial stock of reforms also matters a great deal (Coricelli, 
1998).  Those countries that introduced at least some rudimentary 
elements of market reforms before the transition (mostly CEE countries) 
performed markedly better (in terms of both the pace of further reforms and 
economic outcomes) than the rest during the transition. 
What is the absolute and relative progress of Ukraine with structural 
reforms during the transition?  Although some progress has been made in 
many directions (Table 2), overall Ukraine’s advancement in reforms was 
behind that of all CEE and most of the FSU countries.  It is also the quality 
                                                 
4  The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) Bulletin, December 1999, p.  49. 
of changes rather than their quantity that makes the difference.  For 
instance, both Ukraine and Russia significantly privatized their economies 
over the 1990s (although Russia privatized more), but the quality of 
Russian privatization is argued to be better than of the Ukrainian one 
(Economic Reform…, 2000).  Ukrainian privatization was dominated by 
insiders who often had low incentives for undertaking serious enterprise 
restructuring.  The privatization process in many cases was viewed as 
merely a mechanism of acquiring ownership and was not followed by deep 
restructuring.   
The efforts of the Parliament to take control of the privatization process 
under the pressure from private lobbies and regional elites, the ongoing 
battle between the executive and legislative branches over the issue of 
privatization, and an extensive list of companies “protected” from 
privatization significantly stalled the pace of privatization in Ukraine.5  
The difficulty with privatization, however, is not a Ukraine-specific problem.  
The most common barrier to privatization in 1990s in Latin America has 
been opposition by labor unions and political parties.  Bureaucrats and their 
unions have gained from secure and relatively high-wage public sector 
jobs.  “The prospect of eliminating 100,000 state sector jobs has generated 
so much opposition in Paraguay that the government has been stymied in 
attempts at privatization” (Social and Economic Progress in Latin America, 
1996). 
The ongoing privatization in Ukraine is often non-transparent and leads to 
the sales of attractive state assets for nothing.  There have been many 
cases of “latent” privatization, whereby very liquid state property is sold 
ostensibly in order to honor creditor claims.  For instance, in April 2001 
three thermal plants belonging to Donbasenergo were sold for UAH 206.9 
million to service creditor claims amounting to just UAH 4.8 million.  A 
month later a 49 percent stake in Rosava, Ukraine’s largest producer of car 
tires with total annual sales of UAH 450 million, was sold for debt for a 
mere UAH 4.29 million (OAB, 6/6/2001).  The government failed 
(purposefully or not) to prevent this kind of sales.   
The lack of effective ownership restructuring in Ukraine is perhaps the most 
evident from the poor performance of its agriculture.  Until 2001 Ukraine’s 
agricultural sector has played a role of national embarrassment rather than 
of national pride.  This indicated clearly that the effective landowner was 
lacking in Ukraine.  The privatization of collective farms often has not gone 
far further than sharing collective farms with their obsolete equipment 
among members.  At the beginning of 2000 only 15 percent of farmland 
                                                 
5  In terms of obstacles to privatization, though, Russia does not seem to be doing better than 
Ukraine.  The Russian government is forbidden from undertaking privatization of large 
enterprises without the Duma’s prior approval, and many companies have been on the 
privatization agenda for years without ever being sold (OAB, 5/5/2001). 
was cultivated by the private sector in the form of household plots and 
family farms.  Subsistence farming (dacha plots) accounts for an increasing 
share of agricultural production.  The positive development is that the 
number of private farms is growing, and it is estimated to have reached 
42,311 on April 1, 2002.  The area of arable land in hands of farmers grew 
2.5 times during January 2000 – April 2002.  Despite many administrative 
and legislative hindrances to the agricultural reform, Ukraine yet is judged 
to do better than her neighbors on this front of reforms.  The issuance of 
6.5-million private land property rights registration certificates and 
legislative approval of the new Land Code are considered as significant 
steps for the creation of new class of land holders in Ukraine and the 
realization of her potential in the agriculture.  We believe that under the 
effective ownership agricultural sector in Ukraine promises to deliver high 
growth rates in the years to come. 
Despite the urgent need to restructure the Ukrainian coal sector the progress 
has been absent.  Out of 252 coal mines, 30 percent (75 mines) produce just 
5 percent of overall coal output.  The average cost of Ukrainian coal is 150 
percent of the selling price.  That is, the profitability is negative 50 percent.  
At the same time, state subsidies to the coal sector 1.5 times exceed budget 
expenditures for R&D.  Although annual coal output halved over the last 
decade, the number of employed in this sector dropped by only one-third.  
The share of barter in the total volume of the coal-related transactions 
reaches 60-70 percent, and a large number of intermediaries in the industry 
give room for fraudulent practices. 
In contrast to the Russian stock market, the Ukrainian one has never really 
taken off as the rights of the shareholders have been neglected.  The 
capitalization of securities market is about 9 percent of GDP, compared 
with 20-30 percent on average across Eastern Europe.  The trading 
volumes are notoriously low, and 5 percent of all listed firms account for 95 
percent of market turnover.  The overall volume of foreign investment in the 
banking sector remains a modest 15 percent, compared with 65 percent in 
Hungary and 70 percent in Poland (OAB, 20/09/2001).  With the total 
capitalization equal to one large bank in Central Europe the Ukrainian 
banking system remains severely undercapitalized.  Except the insurance 
industry, which experienced a rapid development recently, the non-bank 
financial institutions (such as pension funds and mutual funds) are virtually 
non-existent. 
To sum up, although some achievements have been made in structural 
reforms, the process of restructuring has far from being satisfactory.  We 
argue that the major explanation for the slow pace of structural reforms in 
Ukraine has to be found on the institutional side.   
 
Institutional environment   
When discussing the progress with structural reforms in Ukraine we have to 
bear in mind that it (or lack of thereof) depends much on to what extent 
institutional environment is supportive to and pushing for reforms.  De Melo 
et al.  (1997), and Heybey and Murrell (1999) find that both the extent and 
speed of reforms are strongly influenced by initial conditions and institutional 
factors.  Political instability, a lack of institutions making economic rules work, 
weak law enforcement, poor protection of property rights, and corruption may 
significantly, if not completely, hinder the process of development.  The 
important question to be answered is then: How the quality of institutional 
environment in Ukraine compares to that in other transition countries?  
The level of corruption in Ukraine is among the highest in the world.  The 
2001 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks Ukraine 83-rd among 91 
countries (Table 9).  For comparison, Russia and Ecuador are both ranked 
78-th (meaning less corruption), Mexico – 51st, Colombia – 50th, Brazil – 
46th, Poland – 44th, Slovenia – 34th, Hungary – 31st.  The poor quality of 
institutional environment and resistance to economic reforms from those 
rent-seeking forces in a society that would lose their privileges as reforms 
progress, are increasingly recognized as the main impediment to economic 
performance of Ukraine.   
Despite a decade of the transition institutional climate in Ukraine remains 
unfavorable and is worse than that in the FSU on average, with the latter 
ranking behind that in the Baltic States and CEE (Tables 2 and 3).  That 
per capita cumulative FDI inflows into Ukraine during 1989-1999 were 
among the lowest in the region6, and that Ukraine’s sovereign bonds are 
rated below junk bonds leading to high costs of borrowing (Table 4) reflect 
probably better than anything else the perception by foreign investors of its 
institutional climate.   
Ukraine is very similar to Latin America in that her authorities turned a blind 
eye on the main pre-requisite for sustainability of growth – progress in 
institutions.  Nowadays the words of Mario Vargas Llosa may be applied 
both to Latin America and Ukraine: "We have democratic governments, but 
our institutions … are very far from being democratic.  They remain populist 
and oligarchic… flawed by social prejudices…" 
Ukraine's administrative reform that started in December 1999 has stopped 
just four months later.  The Prime Minister V. Yushchenko failed to 
subordinate such vital bodies as the Customs and the State Tax 
Administration to the Finance Ministry, and some old Ministries have been 
restored.  The only positive result were the changes in the procedures of 
                                                 
6  Ukraine’s per capita cumulative FDI inflows over 1989-1999 reached 55 USD, as compared, 
for instance, to 494 USD in Kazakhstan, 518 USD in Poland, 866 USD in Latvia, 1,447 USD in 
Czech Republic, and 1,764 USD in Hungary (EBRD Transition Report 2000, Table A.3.9, p.  
74). 
decision making in the Cabinet and lowering of the status of the Ministry for 
Industrial Policy.  However, this ministry, a home of protectionism and 
paternalistic policy that effectively discouraged enterprise restructuring, was 
restored immediately after the dismissal (by a communist-oligarchic coalition 
in the Parliament) of Yushchenko.   
The growth recovery of 2000-2001 is under a risk of severe setbacks if the 
administrative reform fails to be carried on.  It is clear that without drastic 
improvements in its institutional climate Ukraine severely jeopardizes its 
growth prospects, as it has happened in the "old still transition" Latin 
American countries.   
We provide a detailed analysis of the major institutional obstacles to 
economic growth in Ukraine later in the book. 
 
Section 3: 
Identification of the main problems 
hindering Ukraine’s economic performance 
 
 
The transition from the central planning to market economy was often 
viewed as a shift from the economic policy that operates exclusively 
through the resource supply to the policy that indirectly supports a certain 
incentive structure and focuses mostly on the macroeconomic stability.  
Under these circumstances, privatization was regarded as a sufficient 
condition for creating the right economic incentives and actors.   
Now most economists seem to agree that this initial simplistic approach to 
transition has suffered from numerous shortcomings.  Particularly, the 
unfair privatization, especially its mass (voucher) method, has been blamed 
for many undesirable outcomes (for example, the recent Nobel Prize 
winner J. Stiglitz was one of the well-known critics of this approach).  
Although it is hard to imagine the transition without privatization, the latter 
should be viewed as a necessary but definitely not sufficient precondition  
for the transition success.  Other building blocks of the transition road – 
liberalization, tight monetary policy and fiscal stabilization – have also 
proved insufficient or infeasible in some cases.  What additional conditions 
are necessary for a successful transition then?  
Today, we admit that these conditions (whatever they are) seem to be met 
in some countries, such as Poland, and are not met in many others, such 
as Ukraine.  Among many possible factors affecting the transition are 
vague property rights distorted by the discretionary power of state 
bureaucracy (Shleifer and Frye, 1997); the capture of state authorities by 
vested interests (Hellman and Schankermann, 2000); poor contract and tax 
enforcement resulted in a “bad equilibrium” and low budget revenues, high 
corruption and large unofficial sector (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 
2000); or a sort of implicit “social contract” between the powerful interest 
groups to support SBC (Kornai, 1992) by means of “virtual economy” (Ickes 
and Gaddy, 1998).  (World Bank, 2002) have generalized the most 
important factors in two key concepts: “discipline” (that should be imposed 
on the old sector), and “encouragement” (that is necessary to boost a new 
sector).  Their importance is supported by empirical studies and we prove 
that in Ukraine all of the listed phenomena clearly took place.   
As we have already mentioned, Ukraine has inherited from the Soviet era a 
bouquet of adverse initial conditions.  However, a decade of transition 
clearly suggests that the adverse initial conditions per se are not the main 
culprit of the sluggish reforms and poor economic performance.  The 
explanation has to be found in understanding what kind of the institutional 
environment the inherited distortions create and support.  From the point of 
view of the institutional theory (North, 1990) the explanation for the 
observed pace of reforms can be easily found: the rate of transformation of 
the formal institutions is endogenous.   
However, this assertion about a strong “path dependence” of the transition 
process is vague; further efforts are needed to make it “operational” both in 
terms of evidences and policy implications.  We present such evidences in 
our book.  Following (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993) we focus on 
economic actors and political actors, since due to the thin division line 
between branches of power, politics in transition is inseparable from 
business.  These actors are a product of specific historical paths.7  We 
argue that for market incentives to become effective a competitive market 
selection of firms’ managers and owners with appropriate business culture 
must be put to work.  The job of the invisible hand is to create the right 
incentives and to bless the true decision makers, especially, the CEOs who 
run the companies.  A market economy provides competition, an effective 
mechanism for selection of the most capable and motivated personalities.  
This process of competitive selection is a subject of the evolutionary 
economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982, for the survey see, e.g., Nelson, 
1995).  Another reason for employment of an evolutionary approach is the 
fact that transition is first of all a tremendous structural shift, namely, quite 
rapid evolution.  As soon as an economy in transition is far from the 
efficient equilibrium (“neoclassical nirvana”), the evolutionary approach to 
explaining transition is the best applicable one for the same reasons as 
described, for example, in (Verspagen, 2002). 
We focus on the selection of business and political leaders, because the 
economy’s structure and behavior is largely determined by prevailing 
economic behavior of the firms and the State.  Contrary to the widespread 
opinion, this behavior is determined primarily not by the overall informal 
institutions dominating within the particular society, but by relatively minor 
number of the political, administrative and economic elites’ members that 
may substantially differ from the average in their abilities and preferences.  
Thus, besides the informal institutions that are admittedly stable, economic 
behavior is a product of three additional factors, which can be a subject to 
external control: available human capital, market incentives and a 
                                                 
7  We may suggest the following example to illustrate this concept.  Let us take three identical 
samples of the same sort of fine steel.  We then heat up two of them in the oven.  Next, let us 
temper one of the heated and draw back the other one.  After these manipulations, let us try to 
maul each of them with a sledgehammer.  The untouched sample will remain undamaged; the 
overtempered one will be broken; and the drawn back one will be flatten.  So, different reaction to 
the same shock reflects the different microstructure that each of them has got due to the different 
historical path. 
mechanism of selection.  While much attention was paid to the first two 
factors (World Bank, 2002), the mechanisms of a competitive selection still 
remain not well studied and undervalued.   
But, as stressed in the evolutionary economics, for these mechanisms to 
operate the appropriate institutional conditions should be in place.  As well 
as a competitive selection determines the pace and direction of the 
structural changes, market institutions should not only facilitate the simple 
everyday economic activity, like selling goods (hence powering the 
products’ market invisible hand), but also arrange the full-fledged 
competitive selection of market actors, by augmenting market entry and 
exit, as well as the takeovers and enterprise restructuring.  On the other 
hand, if some powerful actors are rent seekers, they can effectively impede 
any institutional changes that allow for competition and hence potentially 
jeopardize their monopoly.  While preventing a competitive selection and 
thus securing their sources of rent, Hellman’s “intermediate winners” at the 
same time often destroy the institutional arrangements of the product 
markets too.  In this way they obscure the establishment of the basic 
market institutions designed to protect property rights, contract 
enforcement, etc.  To prevent the undesirable selection the weak actors 
may either lower incentives (hence suppress the product market, as in non-
competitive transition economies like Belarus, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan) or suppress directly the selection mechanism, as it 
happened in the bankruptcies and capital/management market in 
concentrated economies like Russia and Ukraine (World Bank, 2002).  In 
the first case, the institutional performance is relatively equal for different 
types of markets and results in the lower decline, but at the same time in 
the poorer incentives for the structural changes.   
Therefore, the lack of competitive selection leads to the suppression of the 
“good policies” in all spheres and the peculiar economic and political 
behavior of both the firms and the State – the behavior quite different from 
that observed in advanced economies.  As a result, even the “right” market 
incentives may end up in wrong outcomes (Gaddy and Ickes’ virtual 
economy).  Moreover, the market mechanism may end up being distorted 
or even perverted by the state capture, so that actual incentives will act in 
the opposite direction, as we observe in the energy-intensive industries of 
Ukraine (Subsection 3.3).  In the energy scarce country this leads to the 
disastrous deadweight losses that are partly responsible for the 
unexpectedly deep economic decline in Ukraine during the 1990s.   
The state capture (World Bank, 2002), in turn, results in the 
macroeconomic instability and deterioration of human capital.  From the 
above described perspective we add that due to the opposition of 
incumbent economy/policy actors, the market institutions necessary for a 
competitive selection are especially fragile in transition.  They constitute a 
sort of “institutional bottleneck” for other reforms.  Moreover, as we have 
mentioned before, the institutional (and information) asymmetry may be 
even more important factor of economic decline than the overall weakness 
of the market institutions.   
But why the market selection of economy actors is so poor in Ukraine, and 
relatively strong in Poland?  Why the necessary reforms turned out to be so 
arduous?  And, what the mechanism led to the peculiar symptoms, very 
similar to the Dutch disease ones, but observed in the energy-scarce 
Ukraine?  
Certainly, the set of mutually related factors – economic policies, various 
forms of rent seeking, historically formed composition of the elite and 
economy, external shocks, etc. is likely to be at play.  In our book we 
attempt to discover some specific factors that are particularly important in 
explaining Ukraine’s pattern of transition.  In the Subsection that follows we 
provide some theoretical explanation of the interrelation between these 
factors.  The role of the adverse initial conditions in creating and supporting 
institutional distortions is described.  Then, in Subsection 3.3, we study in 
detail the case of the energy-intensive sectors as a rent pump in Ukraine.  
The other mechanisms of rent seeking are also considered. 
 
 
Subsection 3.1: Why the Ukrainian elite resisted reforms so badly? 
Theoretical foundations 
a) Resource-Oriented Policy 
For the economy to grow it should have some resources (such as 
investment capital) available; institutional environment facilitating right 
incentives (like those provided by the competitive market pricing) for the 
efficient allocation and utilization of these resources; and the right actors 
capable to use the resources efficiently and follow the market incentives.  
Respectively, the economic policy can be focused on each of these 
components.  Economic policies differ in their treatment of the resource 
shortages, demand declines and terms-of-trade shocks.  Consider, for 
instance, a shortage in some resource that increases its price.  In response 
to such a shock: 
• The resource-oriented government tries, first of all, to boost the 
volume of resource supply, or introduce subsidizing in order to 
maintain the levels of production and employment by any means.  
This kind of policy is an activist one by definition and has much in 
common with paternalism, since it is aimed at supporting the 
existing business entities.  The main difference is that 
paternalism in its exact meaning (Kornai, 1992) is essentially 
irregular, unpredictable form of support with vague and non-
transparent rules of the game, whereas the resource-oriented 
policy (ROP) is a broader concept that also includes the open and 
hidden subsidizing, which can be impersonal and pretty 
transparent, but equally distorting.  The subsidizing of inputs 
seems to be the most characteristic and, perhaps, the most 
harmful form of such a policy; 
• The incentive-oriented government usually abstains from direct 
intervention and allows the market incentives to do their job (the 
“night watcher” policy), or tries to stimulate certain desirable 
developments (one kind of the activist policy).  Artificial incentives 
implemented prior to the expected shocks to force economy actors 
to the advance adjustment (as the European-type excise taxation 
of gasoline) may serve as an example of a wise incentive-oriented 
policy.  The tax exemptions introduced in 1992-1994 in Ukraine 
allegedly for attracting foreign investment is the example of the ill-
thought policy.  The difference of the incentive-oriented policy form 
the resource-oriented one is that it either forces the firms to 
behave in certain way or shows them a “carrot” that will be given 
just after some action or change in behavior. 
• In the advanced market economy the special policy towards 
economic actors’ selection is less pronounced, since the 
corresponding market institutions function quite well.  Nonetheless, 
there are market failures in this area that a benevolent government 
should try to alleviate.  The components of this selection-
supporting policy include fair play control, the pro-competition 
policy, protection of the property rights, support of a small 
business, disclosure of information, etc. 
 
The resource-oriented policy is the kind of economic policy that serves as 
an instrument for rent seeking in the process of re-distribution of resources 
that favors the “winners” at the expense of the “losers”.  The well-known 
effect of the ROP is the wasting of resources and deterioration in market 
incentives.  That results in the inevitable decline in efficiency.  But it is often 
stressed that incentives can be theoretically changed literally overnight by 
changing the formal institutions.  To do that, nothing but a “political will” is 
needed.  The magic transformation, nevertheless, does not happen in 
Ukraine.  To explain why it is so, we should stress the long-run effect of 
rent seeking/ROP that manifests itself via the market selection system. 
The components of such system should be:  
• labor market for managers,  
• competitive market investment infrastructure, and  
• hard budget constraints (HBC).   
The first one allows successful owners to employ the best managers; the 
second one directs capital toward the best owners; the third one directs 
assets away from the worst managers and owners.  Both capital and 
manager markets must be augmented by adequate institutions, including 
hard budget constraints.  That is also necessary to make firm’s 
performance measurable.  But the paternalism is just a synonym of soft 
budget constraints.  Moreover, a “hard” subsidization of resources (inputs), 
as well as any other form of protectionism, clearly hurts selection by 
discouraging a fair competition.   
The more discretional and paternalistic is the ROP, the more probable is 
the adverse selection of management.  While in the market economy the 
quality of management usually complements a capital because richer 
owners can employ the better managers, in the paternalistic system these 
two factors are rather substituting each other.  If the State commits to 
support existing entities regardless of their efficiency, the less efficient 
(ceteris paribus) firm may end up with more capital if it can prove that its 
poor performance is caused by lack of investments.  That was a common 
tactics of getting favors under the central planning.   
Then, whenever a resource-oriented paternalistic authority has a power to 
support an individual firm or a sector with resources or protection, this 
support becomes a source of potential rent incomes for both the firm and a 
respective official.  Moreover, the government bureaucrat gains the 
informal property rights to the extent the firm needs such a support.  Thus, 
the more vulnerable and susceptible is the firm, the more potential rents 
can the patron squeeze out of it.  This kind of relations is described in 
(Lambert-Mogilyansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya, 2000) for the particular 
case, but their model can be also applied for the general case of patron-
client relationship in the paternalistic economy.  It is clear that the relatively 
weaker firm leaders (CEOs and owners) will be selected each time, even 
despite the overall inclination of the authority for the overall increase in 
welfare.8  
                                                 
8  Precisely speaking, this is true only if the grabbing hand is not in force (the authority is 
limited in the enhancement of the discretional power).  Otherwise the authority can impose the 
bribery tribute on everyone regardless of its vulnerability and the situation becomes quite 
similar to the traditional Eastern despotism where bribery payments are inevitable for all actors 
and the authority is clearly interested in selecting the most capable ones to maximize the 
gains.  But the grabbing hand itself allows for the discriminatory bribing and hence reduces 
incentives. 
Thus, the ROP inevitably leads to the deterioration in efficiency.  In the 
energy-scarce country such as Ukraine this policy is clearly unsustainable 
in a long run.  We next point out the link between the rent seeking and 
ROP. 
 
b) The resource-abundance and reluctance to reforms: the role of 
institutional memory 
We define the rent as some income resulted not from value creation, but 
either from:  
(1) re-distribution of the value created by others; or  
(2) utilization of the natural resources or other factors not created by 
the present generation (like location, history, heritage, etc.).9  
Further, we distinguish between macro and micro rents, meaning, 
respectively, the rents for the country as a whole, and for the economic 
actors within the same country.  Importantly, both can be either of the first 
sort (re-distributional) or of the second one (Table 5).  While the macro rents 
can improve welfare, and, under certain circumstances, can be even the 
resource of growth, the micro rents are regarded as predominantly growth 
prohibiting factor, mostly because they affect incentives, and thus advert 
efforts from the productive activities (Shleifer, Murphy and Vishny, 1993).  
Nonetheless, under certain circumstances (an institutionally weak 
government but well-protected property rights) they can be beneficial for 
growth if the capturers of natural resource related micro rents can invest 
them into the domestic economy more efficiently than the government does.  
That is not the case for Ukraine and Russia, however, where accumulated 
micro rents flew the domestic borders in the form of capital flight.  These 
rents may become beneficial again only if some day they return home in 
the form of FDI or as bank’s deposits.   
The natural resource abundance, the main traditional source of macro and 
micro rents, was characterized in the literature as a “mixed blessing” 
(Gylfason, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1995).  While providing a country with 
additional income, the abundant natural resources bring the risk known as 
the Dutch disease (in a broad sense – Gylfason, 2001), especially if these 
resources are easily extractable and tradable, such as oil and diamonds.  
This “disease” has three main well-known “symptoms”:  
• the crowding out effect on activities not related to the rent-gaining 
sector, primarily high-effort goods; 
• the micro level rent seeking; and  
                                                 
9  With the obvious notation that the extraction of these resources (mining, drilling, or, say, 
tourist business) is clearly the value adding activity. 
• overconfidence.10 
In the case of natural resource abundance (Figure 1) this purely exogenous 
factor is a primary source for both rent-related currency inflows at the 
macroeconomic level and the institutional hazard.  Does it necessary mean 
that the above-mentioned symptoms are determined exogenously?  
Gylfason, while admitting the negative impact of resource abundance, 
provides an insight that such an impact is avoidable.  For instance, if State 
institutions are strong enough, as in Norway, the Dutch disease (DD) is not 
observed.  Thus, not the macro rent per se, but the development of poor 
governance institutions of specific sort that comes as a consequence of 
availability of this rent, is the necessary cause for DD.  Is it also a sufficient 
one?   
If this is the case, a syndrome similar to DD may be observed in  
a country with that sort of poor institutions even without the actual natural 
resource abundance or any other source of a long-term macro rent.  
Certainly, the macro rent in this case is of the re-distributional kind, hence 
its source is not mandatory exogenous.  To distinguish this syndrome from 
the “true” Dutch disease we call it a “pseudo” Dutch disease. 
One of the possible examples may be a country that has suddenly been 
deprived of the natural resources, for instance, with empire’s breakdown.  
As we show in Section 3.3., a set of symptoms very similar to those of DD 
was observed in Ukraine with the energy-intensive industries as a rent-
gaining sector, despite the actual scarcity of energy resources.  Below we 
prove that this similarity is not just a co-incidence, but reflects a path 
dependent (North, 1990) “institutional memory” of the economic and 
political system.  The individuals and organizations used to certain, primary 
rent-seeking and rent-related, activities that became “routines” (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) for them under the circumstances of resource abundance.  
After loss of their habited rent they persist in trying to call its “ghost” (Figure 
2)  If they succeeded, as it happened in Ukraine, they can extend the DD 
                                                 
10  Noteworthy, the natural resources are the most common, but not the only source of a 
macro rent.  Any sort of rental (unearned) income gained by the country can equivalently 
cause a sort of Dutch disease, since any kind of rent distorts the incentives (produces 
overconfidence); crowds out the value adding activity (leading to the structural deterioration); 
and undermines the public moral (resulted in the rent seeking at the micro level).  The extent 
of the disease, however, depends on the time horizon and responsibility of the ruling elite.  For 
instance, the borrowing of an irresponsible actor with a short time horizon can be regarded as 
a sort of “virtual” rent income, since this income is unrelated to the value adding activity and 
this actor does not really believe that it will pay it back, otherwise this deal is counter-rational.  
Evidently, at the macro level this kind of activity is the re-distributional one if it is followed by a 
default; otherwise it can be characterized as the intergeneration re-distribution within a 
country. 
 
symptoms that are beneficial for them with the help of the re-distributional 
temporary macro rent, which we call a “virtual” one.   
But it is not enough to state that institutions are path dependent.  What is the 
mechanism for this institutional memory? How does this “path dependence” 
operate? Further in this section we show the way it works in the particular 
case of energy-scarce Ukraine that for 70 years used to be a part of energy-
abundant Soviet Union. 
We start from the notion that the micro level rent seeking related to the 
natural resources is usually owed to the fact that rent incomes related to 
the resource extraction are easy to capture – there is no need to employ 
the State (in a broad sense), just to keep it aside.  But even if the State 
extracts all the rent (like under the central planning), macro rent incomes 
allow the irresponsible government to pursue the ROP and waste macro 
rent gains for the paternalistic support of the existing (non-competitive) 
entities.  Both government and firms get used to respective routines that 
are conservative and  prohibit full-fledged selection mechanism in work to 
evolve (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  In addition, the ROP allows converting 
macro rents into the micro ones with all respective vested interests.   
As soon as the ROP is a source of micro rents for the economic actors, 
they may support such a policy by sharing their rents with policy makers.  It 
is one of the main reasons for authorities to support the existing entities.  
But doing this the government creates a specific sort of a negative 
Putnam’s “social capital” – a dense and persistent web of informal network 
strongly tied by the corruption links in business and bureaucracy.  On the 
other hand, the ROP suppresses the competitive selection of profit-seeking 
and capable actors – perhaps, the only effective remedy for this disease.  If 
such a policy is supported by a source of macro rent, then it can sustain for 
long enough – that is another symptom of DD, the overconfidence.  While 
relying on the rents from resource mining, or the export of cheap energy 
resources, the government may rest on its laurels.  This postpones the 
necessary structural and institutional reforms that would cease rent seeking 
and non-productive activities and allow the market selection of the 
respective economic and political actors.  Finally, such course of events is 
detrimental to the public moral. 
Then, even when the natural source of rent disappears, the inseparable 
alliance of business and bureaucracy would try to pursue their habited 
routines and hardly allow for any reforms as soon as they are potentially 
subversive for the existing elite.  We call this propensity “reluctance to 
reforms”.  That is exactly the case for Ukraine in the 1990s, where the 
inclination toward the ROP and postponement of the reforms by the ruling 
elite was clearly intentional, since it was the source of micro rents shared 
between the privileged businesses and their supporters among government 
officials.  Being deprived from the natural source of a macro rent this elite 
was faced with a choice “to reform or to die”– to limit their rents and power 
voluntarily, by reform, or to be dismissed by a social unrest.  But there is an 
escape from this choice.  If such a government can find an (even a 
temporary) alternative source of macro rent, it can afford to postpone the 
risky (for the generation of rents) reforms and continue its habitual lifestyle.  
This “virtual” macro rent brings many symptoms that are usually 
characteristic to DD.  However, contrary to the general case, not the 
resource abundance brings it, but the inability of the ruling elite to sustain 
without retaining macro rents.  That is what we call the “pseudo” Dutch 
disease (Figure 3).   
Another long-term factor explaining Ukraine’s bureaucracy resistance to 
reforms and owed to the resource abundance in the past is not directly 
related to the rent seeking.  It is the allocation of both human and physical 
capital in favor of the primary sector or low-level processing.  Whilst such 
allocation is natural for the resource-abundant country, it brings risk of 
painful structural reforms in the case of price shocks (e.g., the discovery of 
new deposits abroad or exhaustion of resources).  The good example is 
coal mining in Europe that became noncompetitive to the imports of 
quarried coal. 
To sum up, we have shown some theoretical reasons for the resource-
scarce economy to pursue the ROP and create “pseudo” macro rents.  
These reasons are mostly related to the adverse selection of economic 
actors and proliferation of rent seeking, and partly to the problems with 
human and physical capital that make a system reluctant to reforms.   
But in the case of Ukraine there are a few more factors causing such 
reluctance. 
 
с) Adverse selection of elite and paternalism 
To understand the reasons for the sluggishness of economic reforms in 
Ukraine we have to look at some other factors as well.  The reform-oriented 
efforts clearly depend on the quality of the country’s elite.  The position of 
Ukraine on this front, however, was quite weak.  During the last decade the 
Ukrainian ruling circles were dominated by the ex-Soviet nomenklatura 
members.  This “new” Ukrainian bureaucratic elite was cautious, indecisive 
and mostly incompetent.  Suddenly they have found themselves in the 
energy scarce Ukraine and the magnitude of revealed distortions palsied 
these policymakers with fear.11  Evidently, the economy required drastic 
                                                 
11  In 1992-1993 the parliament commission headed by Prof.  I. Yukhnovsky has concluded 
that most of the Ukrainian ferrous metallurgy and coal mining is non-competitive in the world 
prices.  The commission was immediately dissolved and its findings were restricted.   
and comprehensive reforms in response to the challenges.  The Soviet era 
type elite, however, was not prepared for this mission. 
After a defeat of the Ukrainian Republic in 1917-1921 thousands of the 
most pushing, capable and dynamic elite members emigrated.  After a shot 
period of Ukrainization the Stalin’s clique reversed its policy and set up a 
regime of terror.  More than 7 million Ukrainians died during the artificial 
famine in 1933-1934.  Fearing a threat of prosecution for the Ukrainian 
“bourgeois nationalism”, thousands of educated economists, lawyers, 
mathematicians and managers had to leave the country.  Among members 
of the Union of Ukrainian writers only 80 out of 420 escaped concentration 
camps.  No ethnic Ukrainian was appointed to the leading position of the 
first secretary of the local branch of the Communist Party until 1945.  
Ukraine has also suffered huge losses totaling more than 6 million people 
during the World War II.  The second after 1945 wave of emigration has 
accounted for more than 300,000 young Ukrainians.   
After Stalin death times have changed.  However, it was still easier for ethnic 
Ukrainians to be promoted to managerial positions in Siberia or in Kyrgyzstan 
than in Ukraine.  In times of Brezhnev who had Ukrainian roots and was 
ruling the USSR for almost 18 years, the local nomenklatura, dreaming about 
higher positions in Moscow, had no incentives to improve the situation in 
Ukraine.  One of the last Communist rulers in Ukraine V. Shcherbytsky had 
“reigned” during 1972-1989.  His period of ruling almost coincided with the 
time of ruling of General Pinochet.  The main motto of Shcherbytsky’s policy 
was just to follow the policy from Moscow and suppress any attempts of local 
initiative.  Not surprisingly then, that in early 1990 the number of ethnic 
Ukrainians holding Doctorates in Economics or History and residing in 
Moscow exceeded those living in Kyiv.  In 1994 the Chairman of the National 
Bank of Ukraine admitted that if he only had in his staff half of Ukrainians 
working at the Central Bank of Russia he could do wonders.  So, in early 
1990s a weak and inert elite without clear strategic vision controlled high 
positions in Kyiv, while the new team took control in the post-soviet Russia: 
none of the USSR ministers has secured his position there.  At the same 
time, in Ukraine the first President was one of the former leaders of the 
Communist Party.  Two Prime Ministers, V. Fokin (1991-1992) and V. Masol 
(1994-1995), were the Soviet Ukraine top officials.  In 1998 the former 
Minister of Agriculture with openly leftist views was elected as the Parliament 
speaker.  Finally, the retired chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Ukraine was re-
appointed in 1997. He occupied this position until early 2002, despite his 
senior age. 
Another reason for certain degree of conservatism and inertia is the 
demographic structure of the Ukrainian population.  Ukraine is the most 
“aged” among the FSU countries with 30 percent of pensioners in the total 
population.  This is owed to the relatively mild climate (“Florida effect”) 
combined with a high degree of urbanization, low birth rates and the sticky 
wage policy in the USSR that forced mobile labor force to seek higher paid 
jobs in the North of Russia and Siberia.  From the economic perspective it 
means the high tax and social burden; from the political perspective – the 
higher level of paternalism and institutional memory.  Noteworthy, the 
“conservatism” in the post-communist world means not the lassies faire, but 
exactly the opposite.   
We have to note that the overall tradition of statehood was clearly weak in 
Ukraine.  As all decisions related to the USSR economy were made in 
Moscow, Ukraine inherited the undeveloped decision making system, with 
no capacity for strategic planning.12  No consistent programs of reforms 
were prepared in 1989-1992 and the quality of the first programs was low.  
The Ukrainian nomenklatura had the fear of losing lofty rents in the fight 
with the Moscow nomenklatura inherited by Russia.13  At the time of 
reforms’ launching (1991-1992) many people believed in Ukraine’s 
economic advantages (Szporlyk, 1995) and the very success of Ukraine as 
an independent state was related to the perception of success in economic 
reforms.  We agree with Szporlyk that it partly prevented the government 
from the risky and potentially unpopular policy moves.  Moreover, trying to 
pacify immediate losers – former Communist Party officials, retired military 
and special service officers, agrarian bosses, and itself originating from the 
Soviet bureaucracy the first government needed support from this, the most 
powerful, social strata.  It makes the striking contrast with the respective 
years in Russia.  Yet, as we argue further, the main reason for postponing 
the reforms was the related to that risk to cease lofty rents. 
External factors for a long time were also supportive to this passivity.  Being 
highly paternalistic, the Ukrainian ruling elite has continued the SBC towards 
the domestic firms, and has also willingly accepted the same kind of 
treatment from its Big Brother – Russia and, later, from IFOs.  A high 
percentage of Ukrainians at the top positions in Russia (e. g., a lot of 
governors in Russia are of the Ukrainian origin) also could partly explain why 
in 1992-1993 the ruling circles of Ukraine relied so heavily on their links with 
the counterparts from the Russian Federation.  The permanent bargaining 
with foreign donors and creditors is the major part of Ukraine’s foreign policy, 
which looks similar to the well known bargaining within the soft budget 
                                                 
12  This is true as well for most of the other post-communist countries, like Belarus, former 
Yugoslav republics, countries of Central Asia and Slovakia. 
13  The first Ukrainian president and one of the last Communist leaders of Ukraine L. Kravchuk 
has made an indirect confession of that: “Yeltsyn said that he has proclaimed the policy of 
quick market reforms.  Being asked about the recently agreed co-ordination in this issue he 
peremptory said “You have to follow Russia” (The Mirror Weekly, # 32 (356) August 23, 2001, 
http://www.mirror.com.ua) 
constraints’ based hierarchical relations.  It is easy to see all components of 
the latter: 
• the vague rules of the game (e.g., the exact amount of Ukraine’s 
gas debt to GasProm was unclear for 1.5 years; the IMF tolerated 
the partial fulfillment of the memorandums);  
• the key role of the interpersonal relations (the Presidents Kuchma 
and Yeltsyn used to solve the major problems, like debt 
restructuring, during informal talks); 
• loyalty to the partial cession of sovereignty in exchange for a 
paternalistic resource supply (Ukrainian authorities tolerate the 
arrogant and politically incorrect speeches of Russian top officials 
such as Luzhkov, Chernomyrdin, etc. as well as sometimes 
imperative and supercilious sentences of the Western partners; the 
Memorandum between the Government of Ukraine and the IMF 
regulates, for instance, how often the sessions of the Ukrainian 
Currency Exchange should took place; Ukraine’s President is 
personally involved in negotiations with the representatives of 
multinationals and Russia’s regions, etc.). 
As we will see, this similarity between the macro and micro paternalism is 
not just a coincidence, particularly because the “external” SBC were the 
source of funding of the “internal” ones, thus postponing the urgent 
reforms. 
But the paternalism is not a problem of the ruling elite and old directors only.  
According to the poll conducted by the “Democratic Initiatives” foundation in 
1996, 20.0 percent of respondents answered that the “economic reforms” 
mean the strengthening of the State’s support to the weak firms, and just 5.5 
percent admitted “the bankruptcy of the loss making firms”.  As Yakoub, 
Senchuk and Tkachenko (2001) have found, the expectation of state support 
still strongly prevails in all strata of firm management in Ukraine.  Almost 74 
percent of the respondents believe that the government should support them 
if their businesses run into troubles such as losses or lack of investments.  
The most surprising is that two thirds of start up businesses shares this 
paternalistic attitude.  While 63 percent of managers actually do not expect 
any kind of state support and rely on themselves, another 37 percent not only 
consider the State support as a good thing, but are confident that they can 
rely on such a support.  If we break down answers into three groups: a) 
purely paternalistic, b) purely independent and, c) those in between (having 
paternalistic expectations but, anyway, relying on themselves), the picture 
will become more telling.  We see (Figure 4) that the percentage of firms with 
purely paternalistic attitude averages 37 percent, while another 37 percent, 
although being nostalgic for state support, anyway rely on themselves.   
The remaining 26 percent are self-sufficient and self-minded.   
As expected, the purely paternalistic idea is predominantly shared by 58 
percent of large-sized and 52 percent of state-owned enterprises.  It received 
support from 40 percent of medium-sized and privatized businesses (a lot of 
privatized companies inherited old-style management and the respective 
views).  The least purely paternalistic are small companies (31 percent) and 
start-ups  
(29 percent).   
As soon as one of the fundamental features for creation of the market 
environment is the spirit of private entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency, 
the market’s invisible hand should select the less paternalistic firms’ 
leaders.  In Subsections 3.4 and 5.3 we examine how strongly the 
respective mechanisms are in place in Ukraine.  Here we just make a 
general conclusion that raising the new class of independent entrepreneurs 
and retraining of the human capital is really critical for growth of today's 
Ukraine.   
 
 
Subsection 3.2: Overindustrialization, its institutional roots and 
consequences 
An excessive share of industry in the GDP is usually considered as an 
unfavorable initial condition for transition.  Just as other kinds of economic 
distortions it entails substantial cost for alleviation, such as costly and painful 
restructuring of the single-plant towns, job creation, ecological problems, etc.  
Also, vested interests tied to the old industry may impose even higher social 
cost in transition by undermining the discipline and encouragement (World 
Bank, 2002).  We add that overindustrialization is also a manifestation of 
deeply inherited and potentially more dangerous institutional problems that 
may lead to other economic distortions in the transition. 
 
The roots 
The USSR during 1970-1990s serves as a good example in the 
accumulation of a negative social capital backed by the natural resource 
abundance.  No single component of the market selection system was in 
place under the Soviet system.  Instead, the ruling cirdes chose the 
directors not on the criteria related to the managerial abilities and firm’s 
performance, but heavily tied to the interpersonal links within 
nomenklatura.14  “Economic policies” were based on the Marxism as an 
                                                 
14  During the last Soviet decades the tough central planning was in fact partly replaced by the 
pseudo market “economy of favors”.  This was in fact quite closed system with limited leakage 
of nomenklatura cadres and vague rules of the game as a tool of carrying out the informal 
ideology (unlike in the CEE countries).  The Marxist approach has (among 
many others) two shortcomings particularly important for our analysis.  
Firstly, this theory has ignored the problem of incentives, and considered 
the ROP as the only tool of economic growth.  Secondly, the capital 
accumulation, with a stress on the heavy industry, was regarded as the 
only source of labor productivity growth with little attention paid to the 
marginal productivity decline.  Consequently, the Marxists believed that 
while the market economy has some obvious restrictions for the rate of 
investment growth, the communist economy, free from these restrictions 
can grow faster taking advantage of the high rates of forced investments 
mobilized for the sake of the “bright future”.   
Indeed, during 1930s – 1950s this approach seemed to be quite fruitful in 
delivering high rates of growth.  However, the ultimate price of such a 
policy was really terrible.15  In 1960s the inevitable slowdown due to an 
inefficient economic development became obvious.  The authorities reacted 
in their resource-oriented manner: in response to the declining efficiency 
they tried to force investments (Guriev and Ickes, 2000).  This only 
worsened the situation.  Such an investment can be regarded as a leakage, 
because it led to the deadweight losses in the long run and the adverse 
selection of the firms’ CEOs (Subsection 3.1).  As soon as the heavy 
industry was the main subject of these “ideologically driven” investments, 
its size may serve as a proxy for the intensity of adverse selection and rent 
seeking.   
The resource abundance played the key role in the preservation of this 
inefficient system. It has allowed the ex-USSR to postpone reforms for 
additional 20-25 years.  Then, under Gorbachov, with some decline in the 
oil prices the former Soviet Union resorted to external borrowing for the 
sake of continuation of the ROP.  The break-up of the Soviet Union was not 
accompanied by a sound rotation of elite, like it usually happens with the 
bankrupt firms.  As a result, the respective culture of passive elites 
supporting loss-making enterprises that was inherited by both Ukraine and 
Russia led to similarities in the transition patterns observed in both 
countries. 
                                                                                                                 
property rights.  Under this system the adverse selection became even stronger, since the 
failed manager rarely was really laid off, mostly moved onto another position of control with no 
guarantee for the successor to be more successful.  The interpersonal hierarchical relations 
within the “economy of favors” rather then other abilities in fact determined a manager’s 
career.  The result was the selection of weak and heavily dependent rather than strong 
managers (Winiecki, 1996).  
15  About 7 million people have starved in Ukraine due to the terrible famine of 1932-1933; 
meanwhile the USSR continued the export of grain confiscated from the peasants in order to 
accumulate investment resources necessary for industrialization.    
  
The magnitude 
By the time Ukraine has restored the independence, its economy and 
population were the typical examples of products of the Soviet system:  
• The Soviet economic system was characterized by an extensive 
“ratchet-based” growth that led to the remarkably inefficient resource 
allocation, especially in the investments (Guriev and Ickes, 2000).  
Being well industrialized before 1917, Ukraine became one of the 
most over-industrialized parts of the ex-USSR, with a more than 60 
percent share of industry in GDP and the highest share of large-
scale industrial enterprises within the FSU. 
• The industrial sector of the ex-USSR was developed primarily in the 
(a) so called “basic industries”, i.e.  secondary raw materials 
production; and (b) military industry.  Both largely dominated in 
Ukraine.  The share of the former in the total industrial output was 
estimated to reach 60 percent in 1990 (in the world prices).  The 
share of the latter was estimated at 10-20 percent (Boss, 1994).  2.7 
million people were employed in the 1,800 military-oriented 
enterprises making the relative importance of military production in 
Ukraine the second highest in the FSU. 
• While the resource-oriented policy has led to the notorious 
inefficiency in the resource utilization throughout the former USSR, 
Ukraine was the dishonorable leader in this respect.  High-energy 
consumption was considered as little problem in the non-market, 
mostly closed economy of ex-USSR notably rich in energy 
resources, but led to the unfavorable terms of trade in the energy 
scarce Ukraine.  Moreover, the inevitable terms-of-trade shock, 
which followed the trade liberalization, was especially painful for the 
resource-dependent industries, which dominated in the Ukrainian 
economy. 
• Soviet-type human capital was characterized by the huge share of 
professionals in science, engineering and research.  In 1981-1992 
Ukraine had the world’s highest percentage of researchers - 6,761 
per million people (World Development Report, 1997). 
• Although in USSR the problem of aging was recognized just as a 
remote threat, for Ukraine it is as acute as for the typical Western 
European country.  It implies high burden for the working 
generation.  In some regions the ratio of working people to retirees 
is close to one. 
 
Consequences 
Such a structure of the economy entails that Ukraine under communism 
has suffered from the resource oriented paternalistic policy probably more 
than other Soviet republics.  Moreover, this structure by itself made Ukraine 
more vulnerable to the transition than any other country of the FSU since 
deindustrialization or re-industrialization meant high costs in terms of output 
contraction and the shedding of the labor force.16  These difficulties are 
even more profound due to a large military industry since its restructuring is 
notably costly (Guriev and Ickes, 2000).  In addition, Ukraine produced only 
3 percent of the final arms of the ex-USSR,17 and it was the common 
pattern for the sophisticated manufacturing as a whole.  Thus, the effect of 
industrial disorganization in Ukraine was really devastating.  On the other 
hand, large distortions and inefficiency, especially combined with 
abundance in human capital, may imply the large potential for rapid 
“transition-driven” growth. 
Filer, Gylfason, Jurajda and Mitchel (2000) suggest that “Although 
increases in the efficiency of use of current inputs are typically seen as not 
relevant to long-term performance and growth prospects, we argue that 
such a view is an over-simplification, especially in the context of the 
transition from communism to market economies”.   
For such increases to be achieved: (1) substantial re-allocation of resources 
should take place (improvement in the “allocative efficiency”); (2) 
considerable changes in the management of business and government 
organizations should occur (improvement in the “organizational efficiency”).  
                                                 
16  Extending the analogy drawn by G.  Ofer (2000) we may describe the process of economic 
development as a sort of mountain climbing as follows.  All countries are going ahead having a 
purpose to reach the highest altitude, each one is trying to find the way that suits it better.  
Moreover, they may choose different peaks to climb on.  These peaks are of the different 
heights, which can hardly be measured from the ground.  So, whilst the most successful (for 
this moment) countries has chosen the “market economy + representative democracy” twin 
peak, some other groups are trying actually different hills or rocks.  Particularly, the post-
communist countries have climbed onto the steep but harsh rocks that seemed to be the 
fastest way to the heaven.  They have made a significant progress at the initial stage and to 
some extent did catch up with the most developed countries in “altitude”, although the price of 
that was too high in any respect.  But several years later they have approached a top and 
realized that it is actually much too low, and there is no straight way up.  Moreover, contrary to 
G.  Ofer’s analogy, we suggest that there is no any direct way toward the mainstream road 
too, since this place is not just on the different side of the same hill, but rather on the top of the 
different hill.  Thus, before joining the main group, the post-communist countries should move 
downward.   
17  Halchynsky, A. (1999) Ukraine: A March to the Future, Kyiv, Osnovy.  
As soon as no mechanism of such changes was in place, this required the 
active creative work of the government and civic society.  Moreover, due to 
the huge distortions inherited from the Soviet era, both kinds of changes 
required not only the cosmetic improvements in the existing entities and 
skills, such as some training of staff and minor restructuring of firms; but the 
full “creative destruction” mechanism to operate.  This, in turn, required the 
creation of the competitive environment able to select really capable actors 
and provide them with the right incentives and technologies.   
Here we must remind a few more common Soviet patterns inherited by 
Ukraine.  The agriculture, based on the collective ownership, was wasteful 
and not self-sufficient, despite the remarkably good soils and a favorable 
climate.  It constituted about one fourth of Ukraine’s total output and 
employment, but with the important exception of small private plots was 
unable to support the other sectors, as it usually happens in the less 
industrialized economies.  The consumer goods were mostly non-
competitive due to absence of marketing principles (“to produce what could 
be sold, not to sell what has been produced”), low quality/price ratio due to 
the overall inefficiency in the resource utilization, and low flexibility of 
production.  Along with obsolete technologies, poor labor force motivation 
and poor design of goods these factors made the vast majority of output in 
the high-effort production non-competitive.  Even the firms that were 
potentially competitive required some restructuring of the vertical links.  
Thus, most of the existing entities led by the incumbent executives would 
be expected to fail in the fair competition.18  Creation of the competitive 
environment should be supported with the sound institutional policy that 
would promote and facilitate the selection of market actors and firms’ 
restructuring, as it mostly happened in Central Europe and the Baltics.  
Such a policy was absent in Ukraine. 
We argue that the most harmful institutional consequence of the 
overindustrialization in Ukraine was the creation of the powerful industrial 
lobby that, together with their agrarian colleagues, since the very beginning 
of transition started to extort resources from the rest of the economy.  
Ideologically, they have met a full support from the conservative (in the 
post-Soviet meaning) officials that were strongly inclined toward 
maintaining the volumes of production and preserving the existing entities 
along with existing cadres by the means of their habitual resource-oriented 
                                                 
18  For instance, Ukraine used to be the largest Soviet TV sets producer with total annual 
capacity close to 4.5 million TV sets.  This was widely acknowledged as an advantage for its 
economy, since TV sets were in shortage in the USSR.  However, these devices were made 
on the basis of the technology of 1970s with just 8 channels available; the average life span of 
a TV set was one-two years; but the retail price was as high as USD 1.000 by the official 
exchange rate. 
policy.19 At the interpersonal level, they widely used the strong paternalistic 
patron-client relations that were inherited from the Soviet era and remained 
intact due to the lack of elite’s turnover.  On the other hand, after the 
exhausting hyperinflation in 1992-1994 no social force effectively opposed 
this pressure allowing for the state capture (Hellman, 1998).  As a result, 
these lobbies together with the “de novo” rent seekers were granted with 
huge funds and privileges – just open subsidies accounted 60 percent of all 
budget expenditures in 1992, which was one of the main sources of 
hyperinflation.  Then these open subsidies were replaced with the system 
of the hidden ones that account for about 20 percent of GDP (Lunina and 
Vincentz, 1999).  The prohibitive tariffs and various trade restrictions were 
imposed, although partly alleviated by corruption. 
As a result, Ukraine not only failed to postpone the drastic fall in GDP, but 
in fact experienced the third largest in the transition region economic 
decline – only Moldova and Georgia that went through the war conflicts 
experienced larger ones.  The high-effort industries have fallen much 
deeper than the so-called “basic” ones, which preserved and expanded 
their share in GDP.  Since the beginning of the transition the worsening of 
the current account balance, the substantial depreciation of the domestic 
currency and industrial decline became the natural consequences of the 
inherited structural deformations.  Unfortunately, these deformations tend 
to persist, partly because the government’s policy, at least up to the recent 
moment, was essentially aimed at maintaining of existing fixed assets.   
Contrary to the theoretical expectations of the “end game” approach (e.g., 
Sachs and Pivovarsky, 1995), the maintenance of the existing capital stock 
and its expansion was of the major concern for the industrial lobby, perhaps, 
because of the privatization expectations and the well-established ways of 
rent extracting tied to the purchasing of the new equipment or spare parts.  
Here the lobbyists met the government’s intellectual inertia accompanied with 
a natural concern about the sharp GDP decline.  Due to the inherited Soviet 
tradition of the resource-supply-oriented response to the deterioration in 
efficiency, it became easy to squeeze out different open and hidden 
subsidies just by promising that these resources would be invested.  The 
vast majority of these resources were spent for the maintenance of existing, 
often obsolete, equipment.  Consequently, despite a sharp recession capital 
stock has grown by 10 percent since 1991, and, most of this expansion 
occurred in 1992-1994, the years of the severest decline and social 
                                                 
19  Whenever there is a talk for the necessity of more drastic and consistent reforms including 
bankruptcies and firms’ restructuring, the typical response of the top officials is that “we do not 
have enough candidates to replace the incumbent directors” and “we need to secure that the 
new owners will not change the profile of a firm”.   
devastation.  However, comparing to the Soviet era, the rates of capital 
accumulation are much lower.   
The policy of preventing decapitalization by providing capital-intensive 
enterprises with SBC is indeed one of the main causes of deep economic 
decline in Ukraine in 1991-1999 (Dubrovskiy et al., 2001).  It also partially 
explains the observed negative correlation between capital investment and 
growth: if new investments were primarily made depending on the existing 
capital stock (“on demand”), they were largely wasted, since these 
enterprises already had under-utilized fixed assets and, given their poor 
management, could barely allocate new investment efficiently.   
Thus, encouraging new fixed capital accumulation makes little sense until 
the comprehensive system of capital reallocation is created and SBC are 
eliminated.   
The structural distortions were caused by priority development of the military 
sector and machinery production, and the overvalued exchange rate.  From 
mid-1970s domestic energy supplies were fixed at the ridiculously high level.  
While the cost of crude oil has almost quadrupled, the energy-consuming 
enterprises were indirectly subsidized.  In 1990 the price of 1 ton of crude oil 
was equal to price of a pack of Western cigarettes.  The situation when the 
domestic price of goods was close to 1 percent of their world price was 
typical before 1991.  The artificially overvalued exchange rate helped to 
maintain the distorted structure of production. 
To make things worse, production of potential high-effort exports 
(machinery, pharmaceuticals, apparel, and foodstuffs) took place in the 
autarky.  It led to the low quality of goods and limited number of tradable 
goods.  Only 14 percent of exported machinery and equipment met the 
world standards.  During 1986-1991 the share of competitive goods fell 
from 65.3 percent to 26.3 percent, while the share of outdated production 
grew from 20 percent to 60 percent. 
In 1991 Ukraine had a positive trade balance with the FSU republics, and 
the negative trade balance with the rest of the world.  Although in 1976-
1985 GDP growth averaged 3 percent, followed by a slower 1.0 percent 
growth in 1986-1991, the Ukrainian economy experienced a permanent 
shortage of goods on the domestic market, which can be explained by an 
excessive demand.  The negative balance of payments was deepened by 
the increase in domestic absorption with the help of expansionary monetary 
policy.  Obviously, 390 percent of inflation in 1991 did not eliminate the 
“monetary cap”. 
Because of artificially undervalued prices on energy supplies Ukraine 
inherited extremely energy-consuming enterprises.  In 1991 Ukraine’s 
energy expenditures per 1 unit of GDP exceeded the Korean indicator 8-
fold, and the Chilean more than 6 times.  Energy efficiency in Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary was 26 percent, 40 percent, and 55 percent 
higher, respectively.  To summarize, at the beginning of transition the 
unprepared management of the Ukrainian enterprises faced a difficult 
choice between the full closure and radical restructuring. 
The inheritance of the industrial sector, non-competitive on the world 
market, makes Ukraine’s economy similar to economies of Latin America in 
1960-1970s, where the long-lasting experimenting with the policy of import 
substitution caused inefficient resource allocation, stagnation of exports of 
manufacturing goods, agricultural decline, acceleration of inflation and 
chronic problems with balance of payments.  An increase of output did not 
improve the current account balance.  On the contrary, rising imports of raw 
materials and equipment worsened the trade balance.  The direct reason 
for structural distortions was the conduct of the expansionary economic 
policy with the emphasis on comprehensive government interference in the 
economy.  Latin American countries widely used such policies as an 
increase of budget deficit, subsidizing of loans of commercial banks, trade 
protectionism, administrative price and wage regulation. 
In order to achieve macroeconomic stabilization Ukraine, as well as Latin 
America, financed the deficit of balance of payments through domestic and 
external borrowing.  However, the use of these loans served merely as a 
substitute for structural changes.   
 
 
Subsection 3.3:  Rents and distortions 
The initial structure of the Ukrainian economy reflected the price distortions 
caused by the Soviet central planning.  After the price and trade 
liberalization the adjustment to the new reality was expected.  This 
adjustment, first of all, should have meant a reduction in energy intensity, 
as it has happened around the world in 1970s.  But from the macro 
perspective the economic processes in Ukraine in 1991-1998 (August) 
resembled those typical for the resource-abundant country experiencing 
the Dutch disease:  
9 Exports were growing, at least over the first transition years.   
9 Energy intensive products were the major export commodities 
and totaled 66.2 percent of merchandise exports; chemicals 
(mostly the nitrogen fertilizers produced from the air and natural 
gas) constituted 12.3 percent of Ukrainian exports in 2000.20 
                                                 
20  Ukrainian Economic Trends, June 2001. 
9 During 1992-1998 a sharp growth of the share of row materials 
in both GDP and export was observed.  While GDP fell by 60 
percent since 1991 the consumption of natural gas went down by 
just 35 percent.  So, the share of energy consumption in GDP 
over the 1990s increased several times rather than decreased.21  
9 Ukraine remains the most energy-intensive European country.  
In 1997 per 1 kg of oil equivalent Ukraine produced just 1.1 USD 
on a PPP basis, while Saudi Arabia USD 2.1, Poland USD 2.7, 
Mexico USD 5.1, Brazil 6.5, Argentina USD 6.9 (World 
Development Report, 2000/2001).  The share of energy 
consumption in Ukraine’s output reaches 25 percent, which is 4 
and 8.3 times as high as in USA and France, respectively.  
Ukraine uses 1.81 kg of the conditional fuel per 1 USD of GDP, 
while this indicator for the EU is just 0.2 kg.   
9 since the lowering of inflation, appreciation of the real exchange 
rate was observed.   
9 Economic passivity (reluctance to reforms) clearly takes place: 
Ukraine is regarded as a lagging reformer by the EBRD indexes 
(Table 2).  Investment and education expenses are declining.   
Only the current account deficit financed by the rising external debt and 
decreasing real incomes of population (as a result of wage and pension 
arrears) did not fit the description of the well-known Dutch disease.  But 
actually Ukraine is not well endowed with energy resources! On the contrary, 
Ukraine is a net importer of energy, which constitutes 43 percent of her 
merchandise imports.  In 2000 the value of the imported fuel and energy was 
USD 5.9 billion, or 18.6 percent of GDP.  In other words, for 1 dollar of GDP 
Ukraine had to import fuel and energy worth USD 0.186.  The Ministry of 
Economy of Ukraine indicates that the share of imported inputs in the 
Ukrainian exports is close to 40 percent, making the country’s external 
position extremely vulnerable to the price shocks.   
How can we explain the fact that the symptoms of the Dutch disease are 
observed in the energy-scarce Ukraine?  Definitely, for these symptoms to 
occur in Ukraine there should be some mechanisms for generating macro 
rents.  We describe these mechanisms below.   
In 1992-1993 the energy supplies from Russia at far below the world prices 
was a significant basis for generating macro (and micro) rents.  The re-
export of this energy either directly or in the form of energy-intensive 
commodities brought to Ukraine some USD 4-5 billion annually as a re-
                                                 
21  Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1995) misinterpreted it as the effect of the shadow sector’s 
growth. 
distributional macro rent.  This source of cheap energy ceased in 1994 
when Russia increased prices on the exported energy supplies.  In the 
Baltic and CEE countries this price shock has happened earlier and 
resulted in the sharp fall in the production and exports of energy extensive 
commodities, as well as in the drastic reduction of subsidies, fiscal 
stabilization, etc.  This sort of adjustment, however, did not take place in 
Ukraine.  Because the Ukrainian ruling circles were energy-addicted, this 
“true” source of rent has been replaced by the “virtual” one – the payments 
for gas were almost stopped.  This debt was soon taken over by the 
government.  As a result, the external debt started to increase by 
approximately USD 2 billion annually.  In 1994-1995, it was mostly the bi-
national debt to Russia and the loans from IFOs.   
Instead of austerity measures aimed at cutting the budget deficit, the 
authorities have launched, allegedly for the sake of macroeconomic 
stabilization (non-emission financing of budget deficit), the T-bills market in 
1995 and later placed the Eurobonds.  The interest rates on both types of 
financial instrument were exorbitant and, ultimately, unsustainable.   
We argue that the issue of T-bills and external borrowing was nothing else 
but a very special mechanism of generating virtual macro rents, which were 
converted into the micro ones both through the direct participation of 
privileged participants in enormous yields, and the postponement of 
structural reforms.   
Examining the history of the Ukrainian T-bills market, we see that its 
operation resembled a sophisticated version of the Ponzi game, where the 
first players (winners) took all (as the annual real yields on the first T-bills 
exceeded 100 percent) and the last ones were simply losers (as a result of 
default).  There is some evidence that participation in the T-bills market 
was not open for everybody (for instance, the foreign investors) since the 
very beginning.   
The government policy of financing the budget deficit (largely generated by 
budget subsidies and tax exemptions) through the proceeds from the T-bills 
sales and Ukrainian Eurobonds’ placements was extremely costly and 
detrimental for the economy.  The reluctance to reforms clearly took place.  
During 1994-1998 neither guaranteed credit lines, nor restructuring of 
indebtedness to Russia and Turkmenistan, nor loans from the international 
financial organizations were used to finance the expenses related to the 
radical structural changes.22  Actually, the use of domestic borrowing (via 
T-bills) and foreign loans has served as substitution for structural changes.  
At a cost of borrowing through the T-bills market approaching 40 percent at 
the beginning of 1998 the servicing of rapidly growing debts was clearly 
                                                 
22  Just a marginal progress in the corresponding indicators occurred for this time (World Bank, 
2002). 
problematic (Ivaschenko, 1998).  At the same time, the revenues from the 
placement of Ukrainian Eurobonds in 1998 were used in the following 
manner: 55 percent for reducing wage and pension arrears; 30 percent for 
servicing of the external debt; 15 percent for servicing of the domestic 
debts (T-bills market).  In short, it was a game of paying debts at the 
expense of accumulating even higher debts.  Clearly, it was a policy 
leading to nowhere else but to the financial crisis of 1998.   
To complete the picture of the sources of macro rents in Ukraine we add 
two more points.  First, the revenues from fees for gas and oil transit 
through the Ukrainian territory totaling USD 1.6-2 billion annually represent 
a substantial source of macro rent for the country.  Second, as far as the 
gas trading with Russia and Turkmenistan is accomplished in non-
monetary means of payments, it remains a sort of import rents, although 
the significance of this rent is shrinking since suppliers increasingly 
demand payments in the monetary form.  Until now authorities had a 
chance to get rents from opacity of payments for gas.  Ukraine also drills 
her own oil and gas, which generate some macro rent.   
Generally speaking, a macro rent is not a doom as soon as the 
institutionally strong and competent government can channel it for the 
benefit of the whole nation, and hence to prevent its conversion into the 
micro rent.  Unfortunately, Ukraine did not succeed in doing so.  In Russia 
the virtual economy as well as export restrictions and administrative pricing 
for energy supplies help to share the macro rent among the customers, but 
without any credible commitment for the future liberalization it is just 
another form of the ROP.  Ukraine, at least before the 1998, used to do the 
same with domestically drilled oil and gas.  However, the major source of 
macro rents, the transportation of gas is beyond the control of tax 
authorities.  While planned tax revenues from this source totaled USD 391 
million (the potential volume of revenues should be 4 times higher) in 1999, 
just 8.5 percent of this were received.  In 2000 the respective tax revenues 
tripled, but still remained ridiculously low (Section 5).  The rest of funds 
seem to have ended up in private pockets. 
 
 
Micro level 
In the market economy the macro shocks transform into the respective 
incentives at the micro level that finally produce the economy’s adjustment.  
The mechanism that, at the micro level, should force the adjustment of the 
sector structure of the Ukrainian economy to the price shock of trade 
liberalization would look as follows. 
The new political reality has determined unfavorable terms of trade for the 
producers of energy intensive commodities.  For a Ukrainian firm that 
produces tradable bulk commodities like metals or chemicals, the market for 
its output is typically subject to nearly perfect competition or, in the best case, 
oligopoly.  It is usually highly volatile with large-scale speculations, price 
shocks, anti-dumping sanctions, etc., and the Ukrainian firm usually finds 
itself as a price taker.  On the other hand, its inputs are the raw materials 
supplied at the monopoly or oligopoly conditions by Russian companies like 
GasProm, Lukoil, etc.  It makes the respective Ukrainian manufacturers to be 
severely affected by increasing energy prices.  Thus, Ukraine’s comparative 
advantages in the production of the energy-intensive commodities are 
limited.  Without a sound State’s support, the energy-intensive enterprises 
are expected to be either bought by their Russian suppliers, or doomed to 
decline or decapitalization, as it happened in the Baltic states.23  Neither of 
these has happened in Ukraine yet. 
Why despite the sharp price shocks in 1992-1994 energy intensity has 
been not falling, but rising up to the year 2000?  
The survival of the energy-intensive enterprises and continuation of the 
ROP in Ukraine is clearly related to the possibility of generating micro rents 
(at the expense of wasting macro rents).   
The practice of buying cheap (due to price regulations) metals and 
chemicals and selling them abroad at the world market prices played a key 
role in the creation of well-connected (as this required access to metals and 
export permits) fortunes.  It is estimated that in 1992 alone the total export 
rents amounted to USD 4.1 billion, or 20 percent of GDP, as domestic 
prices were ten times lower than the market ones (Economic Reform…, 
2000). 
The import of oil and natural gas from Russia and Turkmenistan, often at 
below the world market prices, and a subsequent exports of these 
commodities to the West at higher prices was a simple, but a very effective 
mechanism for the oligarchs to accumulate huge rents.  As import contracts 
were backed by the government guarantees, this mechanism provided an 
excellent opportunity to create enormous private wealth at the expense of 
the budget deficit.  According to some estimates, in 1992-1999 some USD 
25-40 billion (generated through imports-exports and other types of rents) 
flew outside of Ukraine through the use of fake companies and contracts 
(OAB, 09/05/2001).  Seventy nine (!) percent of payments for energy 
imports are still (in 2001) made through the offshore zones.   
                                                 
23  Indeed, it would be followed by job destruction.  Here a government should do its best to 
alleviate the social consequences of such a shock, primarily by facilitating the market-driven 
job creation in other sectors. 
Having this money, the united lobby of energy intensive sectors contributed 
to freezing of status quo priorities in the economic policy, which totally 
ignored the terms of trade and potential comparative advantages of 
Ukraine for the sake of support of these sectors, or, to be correct, existing 
sources of rents.   
It would be the brightest example of state capture (Hellman, Jones, and 
Kauffman, 2000) if the government had been initially inclined toward the 
positive direction and then, being corrupted by the oligarchs, has changed 
its mind.  But in Ukraine the government seems to have been captured by 
vested interests from the very beginning.  It supported the energy-intensive 
entities by all possible means and, thus, the ROP and inertia prevailed.   
We suggest a set of micro level institutional explanations why the energy 
intensive sectors survived and flourished:  
• The absence of marketing was one of the most notorious 
shortcomings of a central planning.  However, the production 
and sales of bulk commodities require minimal marketing efforts, 
because the information asymmetry between a seller and a 
buyer is minimized; 
• These commodities are easy to barter with, and stock quantities 
can be easily falsified; on the other hand, their production, being 
less sensitive to a rise in transaction costs, is perfect for the 
“virtual economy”, 
• Due to the economy of scale, (а) a number of market participants 
is limited and rent is easier to distribute among firm directors and 
bureaucrats; and (b) large enterprises serve as the basis for local 
communities, giving directors an opportunity to blackmail the 
authorities. 
 
The long-term perspectives of the energy intensive sectors, however, are 
quite questionable.  Their revenues do not directly stem from mineral 
reserves, but are derived from (1) the forceful resource redistribution from 
the other parts of the economy, and (2) irreversible depreciation of the fixed 
assets of enterprises.  The first reason makes them highly dependent on 
the authorities.  Their equipment is dramatically worn and need to be 
upgraded, which requires investments.  However, the poor protection of 
property rights keeps the investment risk in Ukraine high.  Hence, the 
hopes that the Western funds will flow into these sectors are thin.   
So, these companies work as a “rent pump” rather than a producer of 
goods, similarly to the mechanism described in a model by Lambert-
Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2000).  But is it really the effect of 
the deliberate government policy, or mostly the result of the inherited from 
the Soviet era distortions? 
We have performed an extensive analysis of the Ukrainian legislation acts 
issued by the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada), the Cabinet of Ministers, and 
the Presidential Administration during 1992-2000.  In the legislation 
database kindly provided by LIGA Co.  we have found around 10,000 
legislative documents related to the business activities in the sector of 
commodity production.24  Among those legislative acts, 2,232 appeared to 
be related to the energy resource consumption.  This indicates that energy-
related issues were of primary focus for the authorities: on average, every 
working day they have issued a legislative document devoted to this 
problem.   
We have estimated the number of legislative documents devoted to three 
energy-related issues: a) the encouragement of energy consumption – an 
indicator of the ROP in its worst form;  
b) facilitation of energy savings, c) the market-oriented policy of hardening 
budget constraints and leveling the playing field.  We have also tried to 
track the changes in the prevailing means of the ROP during this period of 
time.  Certainly, a single regulation may be worth a thousand others.  
However, here we measured not the effect of these regulations, but a 
government’s activity in the energy-related field. 
The results of our analysis are presented in Figure 6.  More than 1,000 of 
all legislative documents concerning energy issues bring the signs of soft 
budget constraints.  At the same time, just 230 of them can be qualified as 
hardening the discipline, of which 94 were adopted in 1999-2000.  Another 
356 are devoted to the resource-oriented but often not supported with 
funds attempts to facilitate energy saving.  Thus, there is clear evidence 
that the deliberate ROP strongly prevailed in 1992-1998.  Later we discuss 
in details the further developments that took place in 1999-2000.   
During the first period (1992-1994) virtually all rent-seeking instruments that 
were used relied on the cheap or even free (written-off later) credits, as well 
as direct budget subsidies.  Later, when macroeconomic stabilization was 
introduced, these instruments were partly given up (making Western 
donors happy), but instead replaced with barter, mutual offsets, promissory 
notes and other more sophisticated means of the ROP.  All these 
instruments of support were, of course, implemented at the expense of the 
budget.  On the one hand, it caused the high rate of taxation for the non-
privileged sector of economy.  On the other hand, while the official fiscal 
deficit was formally reduced to the IMF required 3-5 percent, the true one 
(i.e., accounting for arrears) actually was never below the two-digit level.  
                                                 
24  The detailed description of the used methodology is available on request from the authors. 
So, actually all these rents, including the “virtual” ones, have flown to the 
elite’s pockets through the rent pump of energy intensive sectors, leaving to 
the nation a liability to pay them back with interest. 
We can provide just a couple of indirect evidences for the symbiosis of 
parasites that made the rent pump work, since just a few episodes of 
corruption were investigated.  After the mid-1994, when the “first-rank” old 
nomenklatura was partly replaced with the “second-rank” one, the 
representatives of energy-intensive industries occupied the key positions in 
the executive hierarchy for the whole period between 1995 and mid - 
1999.25  Then, a special position of the Vice Prime Minister on energy 
issues was introduced.  In February 2001, it was replaced by the position of 
the First Vice Prime Minister on industrial policy that is now occupied by the 
former steel mill’s director.  Although, unlike his predecessors, he is not 
associated with the corruption deals (at least for this moment) and known 
as an honest and successful manager, it is hard to imagine him sanctioning 
the elimination of the current privileges to metallurgy.   
The overall inclination toward the energy-intensive production remains.  In 
2000 the Mykolaiv alumina plant was privatized with the requirement for the 
winner to build the aluminum plant in Ukraine in order to provide the 
country with “independence” in this necessary for the aircraft industry 
commodity.  But aluminum is the typical tradable and can be easily 
purchased elsewhere; at the same time the aluminum melting is one of the 
most energy intensive and ecologically harmful works.  For these reasons 
the respective Russian enterprises are located near the sources of cheap 
hydro energy far in Siberia.  If this plant is built as expected it would bring 
more headaches than gains to the Ukrainian economy.   
Thus, the institutions and links created in the process of gaining and 
distributing macro rents at the initial stage of transition were then used for 
establishing the system of rent seeking that operated through the 
distribution of the value created by other parts of the economy and the 
creation of the “virtual” rents.   
 
                                                 
25  Pavlo Lazarenko, who is now in the U.S.  custody for the money laundering (figures vary 
from USD 200 million to USD 5 billion), was the First Vice-Prime Minister in 1995-1996 and 
the Prime Minister in 1996-1997.  He has been evidently tied to UES Corp., the gas supplier 
with approximately USD10 billion annual turnover, which controlled more than a half of the 
Ukrainian natural gas market.  This is the brightest but not the only example.  We just may not 
name the numerous other top officials associated with various business groups operating in 
the energy-related business, since, unlike Lazarenko, they are not officially accused or 
convicted.  But the results of our legislation analysis convince that their work was pretty 
“fruitful”.   
Deadweight loss 
As we have found, the government of Ukraine has continued the ROP 
lacking the resources to support it.  The fact that more than 50 percent of 
the current meters and systems of measuring are obsolete is very 
pronounced.  This policy has preserved low incentives for the energy 
saving, and the wastes not decreased, but increased.  While the European 
rate of losses of electricity varies from 6 to 8 percent, in Ukraine it exceeds 
40 percent in some regions (Shulha, 2001).  Now the planned annual 
energy losses total 44 billion kWh (Electricity, 2000): 
• Due to transportation costs and stealing of electricity 30 billion 
kWh; 
• Due to ecological consumption of electricity 10.5 billion kWh; 
• Subsidies to population and producers 4.3 billion kWh. 
Thus, more than 40 billion kWh out of the annual consumption are spent 
irrationally.  The loss coefficient equals 22.2 percent.  The money value of 
the annual wasted energy totals USD 1.2 billion (3.8 percent of GDP).  This 
amount exceeds all technical aid and IFOs loans that Ukrainian 
government gets annually.   
Other sources of rents 
If the rent seeking is restricted within one single, even large, sector, it 
seems to be less harmful for the economy as a whole, assuming, of course, 
that this sector has no monopoly power (as the energy sector does) to 
impose the burden onto the rest of the economy.  But even in such a bad 
case, although the resource base for other industries may be lower, the 
incentives and selection of actors remain undamaged allowing these 
sectors to develop. 
Unfortunately, in Ukraine the energy-intensive sectors were the main, but 
not the only beneficiaries of rent seeking.  As in many other countries, 
agriculture is a traditional beneficiary of subsidies.  Huge rents were 
acquired in the financial sector, arms sales, not to mention such purely 
criminal activities as people trafficking.   
The preferential access to cheap credits represents a substantial source of 
rents for “selected” groups.  In 1993, when Ukraine experienced 10,155 
percent inflation, huge state credits were issued at 20 percent interest rate.  
Net credit expansion to enterprises reached 47 percent of GDP in 1993 
(Economic Reform…, 2000).  These credits were nothing else but the 
outright gifts to the well-connected people.  Another common way of getting 
cheap credits from the former state-owned banks was to share 5-10 
percent of the credit in cash as a gratuity for the decision to issue a credit.  
Even if such credits were issued at the market rate, they were cheap for 
their recipients because they often were not repaid.  But this practice was 
mostly stopped in 1994-1995 with just some remnants remaining.  For 
instance, the agricultural bank “Ukraina” was under a permanent 
government pressure to provide credits to the insolvent collective farms, 
which led to its bankruptcy.  Another reason for bankruptcy was soft and 
privileged crediting of the firms connected to some high-ranked officials.  
The bad loans to the tune of USD 155 million were made under the cover 
of the State’s program of support for domestic producers.  However, even 
now the political pressure for the widespread soft or privileged crediting 
remains very strong.   
Budget subsidies to the state-owned enterprises in agriculture and energy 
sectors played a prominent role in creating fortunes and disincentives for 
the restructuring of loss-making firms.  Only direct subsidies for energy 
sources, mostly coal and fuel for agriculture, accounted for more than a 
billion dollars in 1998 and seem to be one of the major instruments for 
gaining the concentrated rents.  Although the share of direct budget 
subsidies in GDP declined from 9-11 percent in 1992-1993 to 4-6 percent 
in 1995-1998 under the pressure to curb inflation, direct subsidies were 
often replaced by other means of support of the privileged enterprises such 
as soft taxation and forced trade crediting that are to be discussed later in 
this book. 
Tax privileges are important sources of rents for clans.  For example, the 
gas trading company United Energy Systems (UES) had a turnover of 
several billion dollars in 1996, but it paid in taxes less than USD 6,000 
(OAB, 09/05/2001). 
Although the most of these rents were addresses to the energy-intensive 
sectors, they inevitably became dispersed among various other firms.  The 
positive development is the clear tendency for contracting the availability of 
rents, at least those not related to the energy intensive industries and some 
privileged parts of engineering, agriculture, financial sector and trade.  
Noteworthy, the rents in these sectors were contracting as well. 
This step-by-step limitation of rents yields the fruits.  Section 5 shows that 
the sectors that have been privatized, and thus deprived of the state “care” 
are now growing quite fast. 
 
 
Subsection 3.4:  Barriers for local and foreign entrepreneurs to do 
business in Ukraine 
The rent seeking of the described sort obscures the competitive selection in 
two ways.  As admitted in the (World Bank, 2002), lack of discipline in the 
“old” sector not only inhibits the market exit of the less efficient, but also 
brings the discouragement of the market entry, hence suppress the “new” 
sector.  Local and foreign companies doing business in Ukraine are subject 
to numerous obstacles.  Using data from the IFC survey of 2.153 Ukrainian 
firms conducted in 2000 (Yakoub, Senchuk and Tkachenko, 2001) we 
discuss the importance of different factors in affecting business 
environment in Ukraine. 
We first present the results of how businessmen rank numerous factors in 
terms of their perceived influence on business development (Table 6).  We 
then seek to answer another important question, which is: Are firms 
affected by different factors in the same way, or the influences of various 
forces are “selective”?  The answer to this question is of crucial importance 
for gaining a deeper understanding of how different forces are shaping the 
business conditions in Ukraine.  To get this answer, we perform probit 
regressions where probability of reporting that a given factor represents a 
substantial obstacle for business development is a dependent variable, and 
a firm’s type of ownership, size, age (number of years in business), sector 
and regional location are explanatory variables.  We also assess the impact 
of the various components of the business environment on the market 
selection of businesses.  For this purpose we examine the effect of the 
business culture in terms of paternalism, business planning, marketing, and 
social responsibility on the firms’ assessment of the regulatory 
environment.  The results of these regressions are reported in Tables 7 and 
8.   
Taxation is clearly ranked as #1 obstacle for business development in 
Ukraine.  The mean score for this factor is 3.1, which suggests it to be a 
very significant impediment.  Within the issue of taxation the instability of 
tax legislation is reported to be a major problem (Yakoub, Senchuk and 
Tkachenko, 2001). 
The current Ukrainian tax system consists of numerous laws and regulatory 
acts, some of them inconsistent with one another.  Securing VAT refunds is 
a recurring problem for companies, and these difficulties act as a deterrent 
to investment.  Companies having local sales can offset their purchase 
VAT against their sales VAT.  Exporting companies often have little or no 
sales VAT, as export sales are zero-rated.  Both permanent instability of 
legislation and high nominal tax rates seem to be the tools of the economy 
of favors.  This combined with low transparency helps to create the 
information asymmetry between bureaucracy and the rest of population.  
On the other hand, high tax rates that firms cannot sustain result in the low 
effective rates, since firms try to defend their businesses.  None of the firms 
that have answered the question concerning the volume of sales concealed 
from taxation responded that there was no concealing at all.  On average, 
16 percent of sales were concealed, while the average tax burden was 
estimated at 53 percent of the value added.  While evading taxes these 
firms evidently violate the law.  Then they become susceptible to the 
discretionary law enforcement, which strengthens the power of 
bureaucracy.  But if the competitors save on taxes by concealing some 
sales from taxation, a firm has a little choice, and the whole economy finds 
itself in the bad equilibrium in terms of a Prisoner’s dilemma, as illustrated 
in Subsection 4.3. 
The regression analysis suggests that small firms are 4.8 percent less likely 
to perceive taxation issues to be a problem than large firms (Column 5, 
Table 7).  We suggest two possible explanations for this result: 1) small 
firms may find it easier to conceal profits; 2) taxation issue is less 
significant for small firms due to a possibility to use a system of simplified 
taxation.  Interestingly, we find that, controlling for size, privatized 
companies are more likely to report taxation to be a problem than state 
enterprises.  Probably it is because privatized companies are no longer 
subject to favors in the form of tax arrears and exemptions from the state, 
while they still cannot operate (or avoid taxes) as efficiently as start-ups 
(which are less likely to report taxation to be a problem) do.  These findings 
are in line with the results of the Harvard Ukraine project and Kyiv 
Consulting group (Dubrovskiy et al., 2001) that have found tax arrears to be 
strikingly higher for the state firms. 
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, the problem of “low demand” 
ranks as the second one after taxation impediment to business 
development.  However, it immediately becomes clear why it is the case 
when we look at the regression results.  The probit estimates indicate that 
municipal and privatized enterprises are respectively 16.3 percent and 12.9 
percent more likely to report “low demand” to be a significant obstacle than 
state-owned firms (which, probably, do not care as soon as SBC are in 
place).  We view these results as indicating inability of the management of 
privatized and municipal firms to find markets for their products and a 
difficulty for these firms to compete with newly created private firms and 
joint ventures.  A high rank of the “low demand” factor should not, however, 
be taken only as a sign of inefficiency of privatized and municipal firms.  
We believe that it also indicates the presence of tough competition in the 
market and a substantial potential for growth even in the present 
environment by boosting the internal demand alone.   
Macroeconomic instability also seems to have a strong adverse effect on 
business operations.  Inflation and currency exchange rate fluctuations 
were ranked respectively as 3-rd and 4-th among the impediments to 
business development (Table 6).  Highly volatile macroeconomic 
environment makes it difficult for firms to plan the real value of their costs 
and revenues.  The regression results indicate that inflation affects business 
activity irrespectively of firm’s size and form of ownership, while exchange 
rate volatility seem to “favor” more joint ventures and privatized firms.   
Non-level playing field is ranked 5-th among the obstacles to doing 
business in Ukraine (Table 6).  The regression results suggest that it is 
small companies that are most probably to be affected by unfair rules of 
game (Column 9, Table 7).  This result indicates that there might be 
significant economies of scale in getting favors, with larger enterprises 
having more readily available resources to bid for a preferential treatment.  
Considering that small business is a most dynamic sector of the economy 
in market-oriented systems, our finding that small firms are more likely to 
be a subject of unfair competition in Ukraine raises concerns. 
Corruption at state and local levels, ranked respectively 6-th and 7-th 
(Columns 10 and 11, Table 7), do not appear as the most significant 
obstacle to business.  However, the fact that 40 percent of the respondents 
view corruption as adversely affecting their businesses, speaks for itself.  
The regression results clearly suggest that it is small firms, and, controlling 
for size, privatized firms and start-ups that experience the highest burden of 
corruption.  Small firms are 16.6 percent more likely to report corruption to 
be a significant problem than large firms, while privatized companies and 
start-ups are respectively 14.9 percent and 11.8 percent more likely to 
perceive corruption as a significant burden than state-run firms.  This is a 
clear indication that institutional environment in Ukraine is not very 
supportive to small and private sectors development.  It is interesting to 
note that while importers are more likely to be affected by corruption at the 
local level (bribes to customs officials), exporters are more likely to be a 
subject to corruption on the state level (bribes to ministerial officials to 
receive export licenses, etc).   
Tax and other inspections are a familiar frustration for business operation 
as they result in the “time tax” and the “bribe tax” on enterprises (Hellman 
and Schankermann, 2000).  They are usually unannounced and require the 
full time attention of the main accounting office and financial resources to 
please the inspectors.  The customs clearance is performed in four stages 
by three customs inspectors from different departments.  Not surprisingly, 
custom related issues were ranked as the top impediment for foreign trade, 
followed closely by certification (Yakoub, Senchuk and Tkachenko, 2001). 
The latter deserves a special consideration.  Total standardization was one 
of the sources of the inflexibility of the Soviet manufacturing.  It is 
noteworthy that by the Soviet law, any kind of goods was subject to 
detailed standardization, which by itself could make impossible any 
competition between producers.  Later, in 1997-1999, being driven not by 
the consumers' lobby but by the lobby of authoritarian national producers, 
this system was recovered as a powerful tool for anti-competitive policy, 
especially trade protectionism, and a source of rents.  The need for 
Western manufacturers and suppliers in Ukraine to establish conformity 
with mainly Soviet-era standards drives up costs without any corresponding 
benefits in terms of efficiency.  Producers are also required to certify both 
imported raw materials and finished products, which is an unnecessary 
duplication.  At the same time exporters have to certify their products 
abroad, since many of the Ukrainian standards differ from ISO standards. 
Investment projects involving construction require a huge number of 
permissions.  Getting a land can be particularly cumbersome and 
complicated.  Businessmen report that for the opening of a new gas station 
one needs up to 300 separate permissions, and of a supermarket around 
150.  The planning stage for investments of this kind can take three times as 
long as it does in Poland or Hungary.  The process is contingent to a large 
degree on the attitude of the local officials, and is open to abuse and rent 
seeking. 
Regulation (intervention) from local and central state authorities is reported 
to represent an obstacle for business operation by 35 percent of the 
respondents (Table 7).  Similarly to the effect of corruption it is privatized 
firms and start-ups that are found to be most likely hurt by government 
regulations (Column 7, Table 8).  This is not surprising, though, as we may 
expect a close correlation between the degree of regulation and the extent 
of proliferation of corruption practices.   
Although pressures from criminal elements and local state authorities have 
the lowest rankings among the impediments to business development, the 
regression results suggest that these factors are very “selective” as they 
target mostly small firms.  We find that small firms are 8 percent more likely 
to report problems related to pressure from criminal elements than state 
firms. 
Interestingly, we do not find the issue of getting external financing to 
represent a substantial problem to the firms.  Only 23 percent of the firms 
report this factor to be a substantial obstacle.  The regression results 
indicate, though, that younger firms are a bit more likely to experience 
problems with external funding.  This is to be expected since older firms 
have a more extensive credit history (or at least a history of operating in the 
market).  It goes in line with Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2001) who 
have established that in Ukraine, as well as in Russia, problems related to 
the property rights are much more significant for the firm’s financing than 
the ones related to the sources of funding. 
We have also estimated the impact of the firm’s business culture on its 
assessment of the regulatory environment.  We first have built the following 
set of indicators based on the responses from the IFC survey: 
Paternalism.  Firms’ CEOs were asked whether they agree with the 
following statements:  
(1) “The State should support my company if it runs into troubles (loss 
making, lack of investment funds, etc.)”, and (2) “We should rely on 
ourselves, not on the state support”.  Those firms that have given 
negative answers in both cases were omitted as having responded 
inconsistently (44 cases).  Others were ranked from 1 to 3 in 
accordance to their paternalistic attitude:  
1 – a firm by no means expect State’s support; 
2 – it expects a support but does not rely on it;  
3 – it relies on the State’s support.   
Marketing.  Firms that responded to perform a marketing research while 
preparing their business plans were ranked 1; others (including those who 
have not answered) – 0. 
Business planning.  – the same approach as above. 
Social responsibility.  Firms were asked: “What percentage of your 
earnings can you sustain to pay as taxes?” (answers were ranked as 0-30 
percent).26  We used the answers as a proxy for the businesses’ social 
responsibility: obviously, the optimal tax rate for a business per se is zero, 
and the deviations can be regarded as reflecting a social concern.  At the 
same time it partly reflects an overall viability of a firm. 
Having Arrears is the subjective indicator for severity of tax indebtedness.  
This indicator is ranked on a 4-point scale from 1 (no arrears) to 4 
(hopeless arrears). 
Exports are the ranked percentage of exports in output; Imports are defined 
similarly.   
The regression results are shown in Table 8.  Generally, the stronger firms 
turn to be less sensitive to most of the obstacles.  Controlling for other 
factors, smaller firms are found to be more vulnerable to the pressure from 
criminals and local authorities, as well as corruption.  We note that all kinds 
of impediments are less substantial for (even partly) state-owned firms, 
although the state ownership dummy is not always significant.   
Some other results seem to be less obvious or even puzzling at a first 
sight, but still can be explained.  While CEOs of the Ukrainian firms are 
                                                 
26  This formulation suffers from the bias due to the actual difference between value added 
(VA) and revenues.  Unfortunately, in Ukraine until recently the value added accounting was 
not required by the accounting standards and hence was rarely done.  It reflects the fact that 
under the planned economy the main performance indicator was not the value added, but the 
output regardless of its cost. 
used to complain about the low domestic demand, “low demand” appeared 
to be rather a problem for exporters, who also responded to suffer more 
(not surprisingly) than other firms from excessive regulation, but not from 
the macroeconomic problems.  Importers suffer from the corruption at the 
local level.  The firms having business plans are significantly more sensitive 
to corruption (at the state level) and unfair competition.  This effect, though, 
can be driven by the fact that the presence of the business plan serves as 
a proxy of efficiency (profitability).   
Two more results, however, need a special attention.  First, those firms that 
have business plans more often complain about the difficulties with 
securing external financing.  At the same time, those firms that have 
arrears express the same concerns.  In our opinion, these results are not 
contradictory if we consider the little role of the external financing in 
Ukraine.  For instance, even among the large and medium industrial firms 
(excluding energy sector) that reported to have made some investments in 
2000, just 29 out of 264 firms used any external financing.  Thus, those 
firms that intend to apply for some external financing (and invest into the 
business plan for this purpose) are concerned about the lack of funding, 
while others merely do not care.  On the other hand, those firms that have 
arrears, perhaps, regret on the lack of soft crediting.   
Importantly, the less paternalistic firms do not seem to be adversely affected 
by any specific obstacle except criminal pressure.  We may propose two 
hypotheses to explain why less paternalistic firms experience higher criminal 
pressure.  (1) The firms with stronger ties to the State have better protection 
from the law enforcement bodies.27  (2) Almost all firms have to deal with 
some wing of mafia – either State or criminal.  It is an important part of the 
paternalism.  Since mafia is very paternalistic by its structure and style, the 
more paternalistic a firm is, the more comfortable it feels being tied to mafia.  
Thus, if this hypothesis will be proved, the link between criminalization and 
paternalism will be established.  We also may conclude that although the 
pressure of criminals is ranked as the least significant impediment among the 
set of obstacles considered above, it is an important factor in the selection of 
entities with the market business culture. 
The socially responsible firms that agree to pay higher taxes are either 
strongly oppressed by the authorities, especially the local ones, or are 
more sensitive to it.  This fact suggests that improvements in the business 
regulation may help to increase the budget revenues (Subsection 5.2). 
                                                 
27 This does not mean, however, that they are under the lower pressure overall – as soon as 
the law enforcement bodies are corrupted, the firms just have another mafia’s protection which 
may be not less costly. 
Yet we should mention that these regression results have to be treated with 
caution, as there may be a number of factors that influence both business 
culture and the assessment of the regulatory environment. 
To summarize our main findings, there is a clear indication that, although 
macroeconomic stability matters for business environment, the key 
impediments to business development in Ukraine have to be found on the 
institutional level.  Unbearably high tax rates and instability of tax 
legislation, corruption at the local and state levels, high degree of state 
authorities’ intervention in the operation of private firms, non-level playing 
field for small firms, contradictory regulation (in the areas of taxation, 
registration, licensing, standards and certification, and sanitary controls), 
economy of favors and rent-seeking represent strong obstacles for doing 
business in Ukraine.   
Our results suggest that institutional measures such as a regulatory reform 
(and a tax reform in the first place) is a key priority for improving Ukraine's 
business environment and boosting economic growth.   
 
Section 4: 
The patterns of Ukraine’s transition: 
empirical facts and evidences 
 
 
As we have seen above, due to certain institutional peculiarities in Ukraine 
the role of the government as an instrument of rent seeking for state 
officials and economic actors is very high.  The major economic actors, at 
least over the 1992-1999, were interested in the strengthening of the 
grabbing capacity.  That manifested itself in the pervasive administrative 
intervention and the power of non-restrained bureaucracy.  The 
government acts not as a referee paying attention to the fair rules of the 
game and the “fair” play, but as a major player on this field.  It by no means 
can be considered as a benevolent one.  The Ukrainian government has 
really strong links with directors of state-owned enterprises, which call 
themselves “industrialists” contrary to the new and small businesses, who 
are the “entrepreneurs”.  President Kuchma, the ex-director of the 
Pivdenmash Missile Plant at Dnipropetrovsk, has won the elections in 1994 
as the president of the Ukrainian League of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (ULIE) under the slogan “If Kuchma will win, your plant will 
be working”.  Fortunately, he did not fulfill this commitment completely.  
Now his successor at the ULIE Anatoly Kinakh is the incumbent Prime 
Minister.  In Russia the corresponding association is politically weak and 
one can hardly imagine the head of the Russian League of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs at the position of the Russian Prime Minister.   
These ties partly determine the inclination toward the ROP conducted by 
the government despite the economic reasoning.  Not less important is that 
the paternalistic attitude is supported by substantial part of the population.  
With the public tolerance the predatory bureaucracy widely uses its power 
to extract administrative rents.  Finally, the crony ties with old directors help 
state officials in extracting these rents.  Together these factors determine 
the rate of Shumpeterian “creative destruction” that is low relatively to the 
shocks and challenges the Ukrainian economy faces.  As soon as the 
visible process of destruction (bankruptcies, first of all) really takes place, 
the suppressing of symptoms cannot cure the disease.  On the contrary, it 
only makes it worse.  This results in the increasing unemployment that is 
partly hidden due to the high barriers for firing the workers  
(a firm has to pay a two-month average salary, so it prefers just to stop 
paying and allow the workers to leave voluntarily) and the fact that many do 
not register as unemployed due to the low unemployment benefits.  The 
most dynamic and qualified labor force leaves for better jobs either abroad 
or in the unofficial sector.   
 
Subsection 4.1: Administrative intervention 
Corruption is one of the main obstacles discouraging businesses.  In 
private talks, managers doing business in Ukraine regularly cite the 
intriguing figure of “15 percent”.  So, energy generating companies plan 
that, at least, 15 percent of electricity would be lost.  Business developers 
acknowledge that for the timely processing of their plans for construction 
this is the "normal" rate of illegal payment to city officials.  Certainly, such a 
practice depresses the market of construction.   
Another example is related to the transportation sector.  In early 2000, 
before the new management of the Ukrainian railroads was appointed, the 
sector was heavily indebted.  However, after the cancellation of the shadow 
schemes (reduction of the number of intermediaries from 600 to 12, 
introduction of a ban on the non-monetary forms of payments, etc.), for the 
first time since 1991 the volume of the annual turnover of railroads went up 
by 9.0 percent compared with the previous year. 
Corruption has become as high-profile issue in Ukraine as it is in Latin 
America.  Five Latin American countries (Paraguay, Honduras, Colombia, 
Venezuela and Ecuador), as well as Ukraine, appear among the 
Transparency International's twenty-five most corrupt countries (Table 9).   
As an example of the growing bureaucracy in Ukraine we may cite the 
following fact.  Despite the fact that during 1992-2000 Ukrainian GDP 
almost halved, the government expenditures on the state administration 
have increased by more than 50 percent.  Their share in total budget 
expenditures grew from 2.2 percent in 1995 to 7.0 percent in 2000.  
Administrative intervention resulted in the highest time tax on management 
that was observed among 20 transition countries in 1997 (EBRD Transition 
Report, 1999). 
 
Subsection 4.2: Excessive and unstable regulation 
Instability of the business environment is a powerful tool that the state 
bureaucracy uses to exercise its gains from informational asymmetry.  
Together with the discretionary or discretionary enforced regulations it is 
widely used in Ukraine to gain an administrative rent, although at the lesser 
magnitude recently.  Below is just a short list of the most striking examples. 
During 1996-1997 the government has made 1,500 amendments to the 
excise rates on alcohol and tobacco products.  The Customs Service has 
spent an enormous amount of time on preparing the national Customs 
Code, which consists of a lot of contradictions with the international 
standards.  The value-added tax implemented by the Government’s decree 
in 1992 was subject to a dozen of further corrections until the new law was 
adopted in 1997; then the latter has been amended more than 200 times in 
two years.  The number of legislative (normative) acts regarding non-
monetary means of payment grew tenfold.  While in 1995 just ten of such 
normative acts were in circulation, by 1999 their number grew to 101.  This 
increase is well explained by a rise in the number of “selective” normative 
acts allowing non-monetary payments for certain business units.  The 
regulation of business activities initially included licensing of just eleven 
activities; by the end of 1997 the list of such activities has increased to ten 
dozens; then it was more than halved by the IMF forced Presidential 
decree.  However, in a few months more than a thousand of business 
activities were required to conduct the mandatory state certification instead.   
The Cabinet has issued the regulation (#159, March 4, 1993) stipulating the 
mandatory licensing for exports of commodities that can potentially be used 
in the military production.  Together with toxins, explosives, radio absorbing 
surface covers, etc., the list includes such goods like polyethylene, 
ammonia, methanol, polyamides, and pumps.   
Another example concerns the real estate.  In the 1990s, Ukrainians 
instead of making deposits to the fragile banks preferred to invest in 
purchases of houses and apartments.  In 1997 the volume of such 
operations amounted to UAH 7 billion (7.5 percent of GDP), while the 
volume of bank savings of households was 4.3 times lower totaling just 
UAH 1.6 billion (1.9 percent of GDP).  However, the powerful lobby in the 
Parliament prevents the establishment of the clear rules (adoption of the 
Housing Code, the Law on Real Estate, etc.) regulating the real estate 
market.  In accordance with existing legislation, the exchanges are heavily 
involved in real estate transactions.  But, the Justice Ministry periodically 
threatens to revoke the deals concluded beyond the state notary offices.   
The Anti-Monopoly Committee, the government body sealed in the 
Constitution, does not have enough power to cope with the activity of 378 
monopolistic structures on 562 national markets.  Now the practice of 
exercising rents, which is widespread in the conventional sectors of the 
economy, may spill over to the new ones such as Internet and 
cryptography. 
 
Subsection 4.3: Poor contract and law enforcement  
This problem in transition is pretty well studied in the literature.  President 
Kuchma, who admitted that 40 percent of his instructions in 1999 were not 
implemented, directly confirmed the fact of the poor enforcement.  In 
Ukraine, similarly to Russia, the government itself acts as the main violator 
of law, although in Ukraine it is more evident than in Russia.  The 
government plays some sort of a game, allowing selective economic 
agents to breach the laws, while punishing the others for the same “sin”.  
For example, Table 10 compares the percentage of execution of the 
planned budget revenues for the transit of the respective commodities 
through the Ukrainian territory for the “favorites” (the gas traders), former 
“favorites” (the oil traders) and non-favorites (the ammonia traders) in 1999 
and 2000.  Noteworthy, the payments for ammonia transit were for the first 
time scheduled among the budget revenues in the 1999 budget.  This kind 
of payments that amount to USD 2-3 million annually was neglected before.   
The level of tax arrears remains high.  Among the main debtors are the 
“favorites” from the basic sectors, who permanently press for writing-off 
debts.  Obviously, this does not stimulate the strengthening of the financial 
discipline.  According to the latest write-off in correspondence with the Law 
”On the Order of Redemption of Liabilities of Taxpayers to the Budget and 
State Targeted Funds”, effective since April 1, 2001, the State Tax 
Administration (STA) has written off UAH 11 billion (6.4 percent of GDP), or 
92 percent, of fines and penalties, and UAH 7 billion (4.1 percent of GDP), 
or 54 percent, of tax arrears.   
As in Russia, wage arrears in the budget sector was a common practice.  
At the end of 1998 they amounted to UAH 881 million (USD 257 million), 
but then were decreased to UAH 262 million (USD 48 million) by the end of 
2000.  However, since August 2001, there are signals that the trend of re-
emergence of budget arrears is visible in some regions (“100 days of Mr.  
Kinakh’s Government “, 2001).   
In Ukraine, similarly to Russia and Latin America, the discriminatory playing 
field forces agents to cheat.  In the heart of the problem is the government 
failure (unwillingness) to maintain fair contract enforcement.  Contract 
enforcement is the most important task that the government has to provide 
for a market economy to function.  We consider the problem of tax 
avoidance as a self-introduction of the long-awaited tax reform by 
economic agents.   
The government tries to fight tax evasion forcefully, thus increasing the 
opportunity cost of it.  Western donors also help in the strengthening of the 
STA.  Such Ministries exist only in seven countries, including Nigeria, 
Columbia and the Russian Federation.  This separate Ministry is 
subordinated not to the Finance Ministry but directly to the Prime Minister 
(actually, to the President).  But whilst the uneven playing field persists, 
these efforts are destined to failure. 
Let us assume the following game.  There are two major players; 
businesses A and B competing on the same market and having initially 
equal market shares.  Let the long-run cost of tax evasion be actually 
higher than of paying taxes.  If A and B both pay taxes, they have similar 
production costs and can maintain their market shares having a profit of 4 
each.  If instead they both evade, they again are equally competitive but 
get only 2 each.  In addition, the government receiving less in tax payments 
from both of them and spending relatively more on the tax collection may 
lose its capacity to perform its duties in the infrastructure (Hellman, Jones, 
and Kaufmann, 2000).  But for each of the players, the worst case is when 
their strategies are different: if, say, B successfully evades taxes, it 
becomes more competitive (in the short-run) and can push A out of 
business.  If A will obey the law, then B will probably suffer from tax inquiry, 
but, having the whole market in its disposal and hidden profits, may hope to 
bribe tax officials.  Moreover, in reality B can have good contacts with some 
big guys, and hence a lower risk of being punished for tax evasion.  That 
would further destroy the incentives to pay taxes.   
 
Table 11.  Prisoner’s Dilemma in Taxation   
 
  B 
  Pay taxes Evade taxes 
Pay taxes 4, 4 0, 6  
A 
Evade taxes  6, 0 2, 2 
 
If none of the players knows the strategy of another player, we would have 
a Prisoner's Dilemma (Table 11).  So, each player will gain from not paying 
taxes or bills, outcomes (6,0) and (0,6), but both are better off if neither 
chooses to cheat (4,4).  The role of the government, which knows the 
payoffs, is to enforce a preferred solution, namely, the cooperative solution 
(Pay, Pay).  It will bring the economy to Nash equilibrium.  In the case of 
the inefficient government policy the players choose (Evade, Evade), and 
the economy ends up in a bad equilibrium.   
However, in reality, players are aware of the likely behavior of other agents, 
because of the widespread tax evasion and an environment with non-
monetary forms of payments.  Even the pro-reform government of 
Yushchenko had to allow the mutual offset to the tune of UAH 3.1 billion 
(USD 570 million).  Our illustrative game indicates well the consequences 
of the government’s inability to keep words.  The government arrears on 
the VAT refunds to exporters (Olearchyk, 2001) grew from UAH 380 million 
at the end of 1997 (USD 203 million) to UAH 4 billion (USD 755 million) in 
November 2001.  At the same time, enterprises owe the budget nearly the 
same volume of the VAT payments, namely, UAH 3.9 billion out of the total 
UAH 11 billion, as the government owes VAT refunds to them.  So, both 
sides found themselves in the bad equilibrium.  Meanwhile, “some fortunate 
exporters, presumably companies close to high ranking officials, get VAT 
refunds on a timely basis” (Olearchyk, 2001). 
The degree of improvement of contract enforcement depends on the 
overall efficiency and the level of corruption in the government and legal 
system.  The government must settle its own bills in time to expect 
economic players to do the same.  Introduction of foreign players might 
help to raise a discipline; however, some foreign companies are also 
involved in this type of behavior.  It is important to produce a positive signal 
in order to escape the bad equilibrium. 
Financial delinquency may also be viewed as a result of an asymmetry 
between the domestic and foreign players, or of protectionism, which could 
hurt non-residents (Subsection 3.4).  Expectations of the depreciation of 
the domestic currency, heavily supported by “captains” of the basic sectors, 
encourage incentives to run domestic arrears.  And, due to the existing 
links between the government and businesses, it does not create a threat 
of bankruptcy. 
 
Subsection 4.4:  Absence of real bankruptcy 
The lack of the effective bankruptcy procedures leads to a weird situation 
when half of enterprises are loss making without any sound consequences 
such as bankruptcy.  Protecting those companies that cannot pay their bills 
against bankruptcy leads to the dissemination of weak contract 
enforcement and rent seeking.  Actually, the anti-bankruptcy policies in fact 
promote bankruptcies, although the “hidden” ones.  They result in a 
growing number of really bankrupt enterprises that are allowed to operate 
despite their value subtracting status.  These companies certainly do not 
pay due taxes and some non-monetary transactions become imminent. 
The high aggressiveness of tax authorities seeking profitable companies 
stimulates the firms to generate losses rather than profits, and to move 
some of their activities into the shadow.  Officials discretionally decide 
which companies will be allowed to function and to use non-monetary 
methods of tax payments.   
Enterprises use barter to maintain the cycle of indebtedness, helping them to 
avoid restructuring.  This resistance to restructuring gets support from the 
government (Commander and Mumssen, 1998).  By allowing enterprises to 
pay taxes in kind, tax offsets provide an incentive to avoid restructuring.” 
(Ickes and Gaddy, 1998).  Typically, an official reason to avoid bankruptcy, 
as preached by the government, is to protect employment.  In fact, such 
policy keeps the old inefficient enterprises operational.  While this policy 
“has protected jobs and reduced social unrest, it has done so at the cost of 
retarding the momentum for privatization and restructuring and 
encouraging barter” (Thirsk, 2000).  It is argued that since many 
enterprises are potentially insolvent, the bankruptcy of some of them could 
cause a chain of bankruptcies.  In fact, the entire legal system provides 
effective anti-bankruptcy protections.  Creditors do not have much chance 
of benefiting financially from initiating bankruptcy actions.  Thus, in the case 
of a loss-making enterprise, some barter arrangements would work much 
better both for the creditor and debtor.  The government protects these 
enterprises by enabling them to “swap products they could never sell”. 
Barter per se is not the main problem of Ukraine’s economy.  “The 
institutional policies that effectively support soft budget constraints (barter, 
arrears, non-monetary forms of payments, shadow operations, etc.) are 
actually harmful for the business environment” (Szyrmer and Besedina, 
2001). 
 
Subsection 4.5:  Soft budget constraints and  
non-monetary means of payments 
A Soviet-style SBC principle (Kornai, 1992) remains the keystone of the 
government’s policy in Ukraine.  The government uses high tax rates and 
other fiscal confiscation measures to extract money from profitable 
enterprises in order to support inefficient enterprises.  Different non-
transparent payment arrangements, including barter, enable this policy.   
The whole system of the “economy of favors” was based on the barter with 
favors among the nomenklatura members.  One of these favors was a 
supply of scarce commodities (“deficit”) on the mutual offset basis.  In the 
early 1990s barter was practiced more implicitly.  Enterprises simply kept 
exchanging products at prices covering costs, while the state sought to 
generously subsidize these prices.  The main problems were the sharp 
increase in the cost of energy, markets’ shrinkage due to the new political 
reality and shifts in demand.  This multilateral “implicit” barter among 
enterprises, over a longer period of time, was a recipe for disaster.  The 
Ukrainian authorities carried out the policy of the government control of the 
majority of enterprises and the maintenance of almost full employment.  As 
a result, GDP declined and inflation exceeded 10,000 percent in 1993.  
Under such conditions barter was a convenient way of doing business, 
although all transactions were formally expressed in the monetary units and 
primarily were not officially recognized as barter transactions. 
Non-monetary forms of payments became an obvious choice of enterprises 
under the following governmental policies: 
9 high inflation;  
9 high fiscal deficit; 
9 very high cost of bank credits;  
9 tax arrears, tolerated by the authorities; 
9 frequent debt write-offs; 
9 official avoidance of bankruptcies of loss making 
enterprises; 
9 slow and nontransparent privatization,  
9 volatile exchange rate; 
9 gradually increasing impediments to foreign trade.   
Barter was a continuation of the Soviet-era activities.  Over time explicit 
subsidies to commercial enterprises declined from 17 percent to 4 percent.  
This occurred under the IMF supervision in 1995 as a result of anti-
inflationary efforts aimed at cutting the budget deficit. 
The SBC policy, through which the authorities chose “favorites” or “milk 
cows”, is the key to bureaucratic controls over the economy.  The 
paternalistic treatment of some enterprises requires a harsher tax burden 
on other ones, enabling authorities to collect revenues and to continue the 
micro-management of the economy.  In a non-discriminating environment, 
the importance of ruling circles would not be so significant.   
Taxes and other payments are the main measures enabling a large scale 
redistribution of incomes, implemented partly by the rules (high tax rates), 
and partly by discretionary decisions of the authorities (“mutual 
settlements” deals (The Barter Economy…, 2000); penalties for some 
taxpayers and tax debt write-offs for others, etc.).  The idiosyncrasy of the 
tax system and high tax rates and payments are emphasized as important 
factors determining the choice by enterprises of the transaction types.  
According to (Yakoub, Senchuk and Tkachenko, 2001) 22.3 percent of 
sales in 2000 were paid by barter and other non-monetary forms of 
payments. 
 
 
Barter in Ukraine and Russia 
There are similar patterns in the use of barter in Ukraine and Russia.  
Before 1995 barter remained at a relatively low level.  In 1995-1997 it grew 
from about 20 to 40 percent of total sales of industrial output.  In 1998 the 
share of barter in total sales of the manufacturing sector reached its peak 
(around 50 percent) in Russia and remained stable at approximately 40 
percent in Ukraine.  Since then it was shrinking in both countries (Figure 6).   
Under unsafe property rights and poor contract enforcement, barter helped 
to reduce the risks.  However, the specific feature of Ukraine is that the 
government itself is actively involved in the promotion and/or preservation 
of the non-monetary means of payments, while in Russia the barter deals 
are concluded primarily among enterprises.  The world’s biggest barter deal 
is the Ukrainian-Russian agreement on the annual supply of 32 billion cu.  
m.  of the Russian natural gas to Ukraine as a payment in-kind for the 
transit of 110-130 billion cu.  m.  of gas through the Ukrainian territory.  
When some professionals in the government decided to demand payments 
in the monetary form, the influential lobby from the President’s 
administration terminated this idea.  In 2000 President Kuchma has 
intervened personally in the process when the former first Vice Premier Y. 
Tymoshenko was ready to reach an agreement on a supply to Ukraine of 
the Turkmen’s natural gas that would be paid in a monetary form only.  
After that interference, the signed agreement includes provision on a  
50-percent payment in goods, works, etc. 
The clear example of the open participation of the government in the 
legalization of the non-monetary means of payments is the creation in 1998 
of the special state company Ukrspetsfin, which was involved in the 
operations with the exchange, discounting and accounting of debts, and the 
schemes involving mutual cancellation and promissory notes.  It was 
dissolved at the end of 1999 by one of the first Yushchenko’s decrees. 
So, until 2000 the government actually blessed and led the process of 
dissemination of the non-monetary means of payments instead of fighting 
them.  This policy was allegedly aimed at the protection of jobs, but “high” 
employment in the idle Ukrainian enterprises did not lead to GDP growth.  
When this policy was abandoned in early 2000, it has not, evidently, led to 
any rise in unemployment, but resulted in the GDP growth.  We consider this 
result as the manifestation of the increasing rate of “creative destruction”. 
 
Subsection 4.6: Labor market: job creation and job destruction 
While ruling circles fail to formulate a clear strategy of development, the 
Ukrainian labor market experiences profound adjustments associated with 
the transition period.   
As a result of adverse demographic and labor market conditions 
employment in Ukraine dropped from 24.5 million people in 1990 to 21.8 
million in 2000 (OAB, 8/03/00).  Unemployment has been steadily 
increasing since the beginning of transition.  As measured by the number of 
officially registered unemployed, unemployment rate in Ukraine has 
reached 5.3 percent by the end of 2000.  According to ILO, the 
unemployment rate is about 12 percent.  The highest estimate of 
unemployment rate was made by the Head of the Parliament’s Committee 
on Social Policy and Labor Issues (Hoshovska, 2001), who announced that 
the actual unemployment rate in Ukraine reached 26.22 percent.  An 
alarming development in Ukraine’s labor market is an increasing duration of 
unemployment.  It is estimated that about one-third of job-seekers 
(including unregistered ones) failed to find a job during one to two years, 
while the other one-third has remained unemployed for three years and 
more (OAB, 2/10/00). 
The process of economic restructuring is expected to manifest itself in a high 
rate of job turnover (defined as the sum of job creation and job destruction 
rates) as (and if) firms seek ways of enhancing production efficiency.28  The 
evidence suggests, however, that so far the job turnover in Ukraine has been 
dominantly driven by job destruction rather than job creation.29  For instance, 
based on a sample of 300 firms in Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk (a sample is not 
representative for Ukraine as a whole), Konings and Walsh (1999) found that 
in Ukraine from 1991 to 1996 the rate of job destruction increased from 7.8 
percent to 15.3 percent, whereas the rate of job creation grew, mostly at the 
account of de novo firms, from 0.1 percent to 2.5 percent.30  The average net 
employment growth rate in 2000 was –3 percent (Yakoub, Senchuk and 
Tkachenko, 2001).  However, employment growth rate varies a lot by sector, 
type of firm ownership and firm size (Table 12).  It is worth noting that those 
sectors (industry and construction) that have been identified as having the 
highest slackness (in terms of excessive labor) by our logistic analysis using 
1995 data (Table 13) exhibit the highest shedding of labor according to the 
2000 firm-level data.  This suggests that active economic restructuring may 
indeed be on its way in Ukraine now.  Yet, the evidence indicates that on 
average only de novo firms have so far contributed to job creation.31  The fact 
that these firms were able to combine positive rate of employment growth 
with rising productivity (Table 14) suggests that private sector can serve as a 
main facilitator of both job creation and economic recovery in Ukraine.   
                                                 
28  Although representing a necessary step toward achieving long-run efficiency, worker 
displacement during the transition may have severe short-run implications for growth as it 
involves the destruction of firm-specific human capital. 
29  That may suggest (not surprisingly) that Ukraine is still very far from entering a mature 
stage of transition, where job creation equals or dominates job destruction, as observed in 
several transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Faggio and Konings, 2001). 
30  The comparison (tentative, since firm samples are not fully comparable across countries) to 
Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania indicates (using data on job destruction and 
creation in these countries from Faggio and Konings, 2001) that the rate of job destruction in 
Ukraine has been generally higher (probably reflecting less favorable initial conditions such as 
over-industrialized economy), while the rate of job creation has been lower (due to 
paternalistic policy of supporting the existing entities rather than facilitating the creation of the 
new ones, limited regional mobility, etc.). 
31  The emerging pattern is that job destruction is driven by the old firms’ downsizing or 
exiting, while job creation by de novo firms’ creation (market entry) and expansion. 
Nonetheless, the possibilities for a fast job creation can be hindered by, 
among other factors, an unfavorable initial sector structure of the economy.  
Garibaldi and Mauro (1999) argue that the initial allocation of jobs by 
economic sectors is a significant determinant of overall job creation, and 
that countries with larger shares of employment in agriculture and 
traditional manufacturing are expected to be among the slowest job 
creators.  Ukraine’s perverted economic structure marked with the 
preponderance of industry and inefficient agriculture, and a continuing 
apathy of ruling circles to structural reforms, makes the process of job 
creation difficult and slow. 
However, in the present conditions labor force is mostly concerned not with 
finding jobs as such, but with securing high wage jobs (by local standards, 
of course).  It is also very common to hold multiple jobs and/or work extra 
hours to compensate for insufficient income from a regular employment.  
Despite 9.1 percent growth in GDP in 2001 the average monthly wage was 
close to just USD 70, while the dynamic and educated people were seeking 
earnings starting from USD 300 and up.  According to (Hoshovska, 2001), 
there are 120,000 Ukrainians working illegally in Italy, 100,000 in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, 50,000 in Spain, 25,000 in Portugal, etc.  However, 
according to the Ministry of Labor (TV Channel 1+1, November 2, 2001) the 
number of Ukrainian citizens working abroad varies from 1.5 to 2 million 
people.  The vast majority of them simply avoid costly registration in the 
Ukrainian consulates.   
Absence of the faster high-wage job creation cannot provide a mechanism 
for the increase in country’s output.  Millions of Ukrainians, being tired to 
wait for economic restructuring, are voting for higher wages and better 
living conditions with their feet.  Employment-stimulating policies, such as 
lower worker dismissal costs and lower taxation of labor earnings, may 
have important mutual spillover effects on job creation and economic 
growth.  However, these policies will be fruitful only if accompanied by 
improvements in the business environment and changes in the rent-
seeking behavior of ruling circles. 
 
Section 5:  
Crisis-1998 as a Turning Point for Growth 
(1998-2001) 
 
 
Subsection 5.1: Depletion of sources of rents 
As we noticed in the previous sections, ruling circles of Ukraine used 
numerous opportunities to gain lofty rents within a limited time horizon.  
The only hope for growth to come was in achieving the moment when 
these rents would be over.   
After the Asian crisis in the fall of 1997, the fever of crisis approached the 
big emerging markets on the other continents – Brazil and Russia.  The 
economic policy of the latter despite the huge foreign assistance and 
inherited infrastructure of the superpower (more qualified government 
servicemen, membership in the international organizations, trade missions 
abroad, permanent currency, moderate reserves of the Central Bank, etc.) 
was far from sound.  The Russian finance was in total disarray.  The heavy 
reliance on domestic Treasury bills (GKOs in Russian abbreviation) and 
forward contracts in conditions of absence of structural reforms led to a 
financial “heart attack”.  The third stroke in August 1998 was crucial.  
Russia has announced default on servicing T-bills. 
In behavior of the Ukrainian authorities in 1998 domestic political 
considerations – upcoming spring 1998 Parliamentary elections - had 
prevailed.  The frictions in relations with the IMF and World Bank became 
clearly distinguished at the end of 1996, when the legislative initiative 
known as “The package of economic growth” was not approved by the 
Parliament.  One of the main reasons for this was a passive position of the 
Presidential Administration, which was happy with the current rent 
revenues and not interested in the real changes.  With a certain degree of 
hypocrisy the authorities twice (in January and June 1997) had refused to 
cancel subsidies on housing rents and communal services, although it has 
been stipulated in the Memorandum between the IMF and the Government 
of Ukraine.32  Although such a move was explained by the desire to protect 
low-income strata of population, actually it led to extra profits of T-bills 
holders.  The anticipated cost of increase of communal services, leading to 
an increase of the CPI by 10-15 percent, and, consequently to deducting 
                                                 
32  This issue is indeed much more complex.  The increase in prices has to be preceded by the 
comprehensive reform of the public utility sector that is still postponed.   
profits of T-bill buyers, has already been assumed in the price of these 
securities.  Due to the more favorable economic situation (decline in 
inflation, introduction of the full-fledged currency) since June 1997, the 
government has began to demonstrate its illusionary independence from 
the IFOs by relying on short-term speculative capital flows into domestic T-
bills and the fiduciary loan from Chase Manhattan in August 1997. 
The idea of conservation of the situation “rents instead of reforms” was 
deeply embedded in the minds of authorities.  Being reluctant to implement 
structural reforms, in February and March 1998 they surprised the world 
making a debut on the Eurobond market by issuing bonds at the exorbitant 
16-percent interest rate.  The rent cycle continued and in March 1998 the 
government has deliberately violated the budget deficit benchmark using 
international funds not for their primary target but for some repayments of 
pension arrears, which caused an anger of the IMF and termination of the 
stand-by program in April 1998.  The idea of the Big Sweet Carrot – the 
Extended Fund Facility - financing has almost disappeared.   
The next important date for the ruling circles was November 1999, the time 
of the presidential races.  Some sources of short-term rents (credit lines, 
grants) have been exhausted.  Anyway, the authorities had at their disposal 
some other options for maintaining a status quo: further increase of wage 
and pension arrears, reliance on T-bills and a chance of borrowing from 
private Western and Japanese financial institutions.  On April 16, 1998 the 
government has passed the resolution increasing the volume of the 
Treasury bills issuance four-fold from UAH 2,997 million (USD 1.3 billion) to 
UAH 11,472 million (USD 5.1 billion). 
So, they tried all these options and it helped to withhold the day of 
inevitable breakdown.  The reserves of the National Bank of Ukraine fell to 
a historic low after servicing the loan from Nomura.  The day of default was 
visible at the middle of November 1998.  But the passivity and confidence 
of Ukrainian elite was really striking.  This peculiar game ended in the fall 
1998 with a deep crisis.  However, the Ukrainian authorities were lucky to 
escape an even deeper financial collapse because Russia had fallen first.  
After that the Ukrainian conditions of T-bill restructuring “30 cents for 1 
dollar” looked attractive comparing with the Russian “10 cents for 1 dollar” 
ones.   
Since the fall of 1998 the Government had to abandon the attempts to 
secure funds from private and government external sources.  However, the 
authorities were supported by the IMF, which was fast enough to resume 
financing under the EFF terms.  Soft political conditions returned.  The idea 
of a further resumption and expansion of the T-bill market has been 
promoted by the IMF advisors.  However, at this time sober-minded 
professionals from the Ukrainian Finance Ministry and Ukrainian 
commercial banks protested.  The credibility of the monetary authorities 
was undermined and the National Bank of Ukraine became the only buyer 
of domestic T-bills on the primary market.  This way before 1998 
Parliamentary elections UAH 92 million (USD 46 million), and before 1999 
Presidential elections UAH 402 million (USD 90.3 million) were issued for 
the partial redemption of the pension arrears.  This threat of default was 
even more realistic, since after the 1998 currency devaluation the 
government has frozen some important prices, as for electricity and wheat 
grain, for the same political reasons.  These prices were to be inevitably 
raised or liberalized because they did not cover the true cost.   
In addition, the Presidential Administration unofficially banned the switch-
offs of the large industrial firms for the energy arrears up to the elections 
date, which resulted in UAH 9 billion increase in this kind of arrears with the 
fuel shortage as an inevitable consequence.   
The ruling circles still continued to rely on energy rents.  For this the 
government agreed to lower tariff rates for transit of Russian energy 
supplies through the Ukrainian territory, missing budget revenues but 
gaining new rents.  Some Western financing has resumed in 1999 but it 
was not used productively and by December 1999 the government was in a 
triple emergency situation: 
• it lacked funds for servicing external debt obligations 
• the energy system was at the brink of collapse because of shortage 
of fuel, and 
• the year of 2000 could bring another wave of high inflation. 
Under the pressure of external creditors the ruling circles agreed to appoint 
a limited number of people with pro-market reputation to the top positions in 
the government.  Although at the end of 1999 the elite could still get some 
sources of rent from the Russian counterparts, their position after the 
change of administration in Moscow became tougher. 
 
Subsection 5.2:  Semi-default and pro-reform policy 
Unlike Russia and other energy abundant countries, Ukraine lacks 
resources to support her energy-inefficient economic structure and can not 
afford it any more.  This fact became obvious after the 1998 crisis.  
Actually, every late fall the same story repeated: due to the non-payments 
and non-equivalent barter the energy sector suffered from the fuel shortage 
and the respective minister reported to the President that in a few weeks 
the energy system would crash unless some funds be granted for the 
purchase of fuels.  There were two main ways of solving this problem: 
State subsidizing (the notorious illegal consumption of gas was indeed paid 
by the government anyway); and squeezing of payments from the 
customers.  The first was shrinking year-by-year due to the contraction in 
the State’s capacity; the second one (the hardening of the budget 
constraints) has expanded.  Interestingly, right after a few hundreds of non-
payers were switched off, the others have always found some cash to pay 
for electricity and the problem has been solved – just for one year.  The 
situation was particularly severe in 1999, when the external resources of 
financing were exhausted and Russia started to impose hard budget 
constraints.   
Yushchenko’s Cabinet appointed in December 1999 has made a crucial 
step in the de-virtualization and tightening of the financial discipline.  The 
new people in the government had to find new sources of financing and 
they decided to increase revenues through acceleration of privatization, 
thus strengthening the base of reforms.  The government policy became 
less paternalistic because the reform-minded people did not held leading 
positions in the government before and had no direct connections with 
“captains” of loss-making state-owned enterprises.  The adoption of a 
deficit-free budget had also made its impact on government activity.  
Another real opportunity for the increase in budget revenues was a stricter 
financial discipline and attack on non-monetary means of payments. 
The quality of Cabinet’s legislative documents also improved drastically.  
Even at the first glance the difference between the period of 1992-1998 and 
the year of 2000 is striking.  By our data, for the whole period of low prices 
for energy inputs, 1992-1993, only few documents devoted to the 
hardening of payments were adopted, instead a majority was devoted to 
granting the firms write-offs and privileges.  In 1996 the main flow of 
documents was devoted to the special barter schemes of payments; in 
1998 for mutual settlements and arrears.  But the major vector, as well as a 
style, remained pretty similar, although slowly evolving.  In 2000 the 
hardening of the budget constraints was a major direction for Cabinet’s 
policy.  Although this policy remained quite controversial, the many issued 
orders were devoted to the cancellation of previously granted privileges. 
First, the government succeeded in restructuring of the external debt, which 
gave it more room to maneuver.   
Second, the government carried out the liberalization of the monetary and 
exchange rate policy.  The depreciation of the hryvnia has eliminated the 
macroeconomic consequences of the pseudo DD (Section 3).  The 
domestic high-effort goods became more competitive, although it would not 
happen if their manufacturers did not undergo the post-privatization 
restructuring in 1995-1998.  For example, by 2001 Ukrainian companies 
regained control of the domestic food market having the  
94-percent share, while in 1995, the year of the same real exchange rate, 
their share was below 40 percent.  As a result, the composition of exports 
improved and trade balance became positive (Dubrovskiy and Shygayeva, 
2000).  Another important outcome was increase in the money demand.   
Third, the mutual budget offsets were officially forbidden, as well as the 
barter in the energy sector.  Although later the government has violated this 
commitment, initially it has played an important role in the suppressing of 
the “offset expectations”, one of the most important cornerstones of the 
“virtual economy” (Ickes and Gaddy, 1998).  The non-monetary 
transactions fell drastically - that further contributed to the increase in 
money demand.   
Finally, the personal factor has played its role: the new government prepared 
a monetary surprise.  Because V. Yushchenko had a reputation of a tough 
monetarist, nobody of economic players expected a dramatic 45-percent 
increase of the money supply.  But because of the above listed factors, such 
an expansion resulted in just 25 percent inflation, mostly caused by the 
liberalization of grain prices.  This non-inflation emission along with an 
increase of budget revenues due to the hardening of the budget constraints 
allowed some repayment of wage arrears and full redemption of pension 
arrears that improved the purchasing power of households.  Rising domestic 
consumer demand turned out to be one of the significant components of 
growth-2000.  This part was missing in the previous decade. 
The increase in real GDP can also be partially explained by the increase in 
the demand for the traditional Ukrainian exports (metals and chemicals).  
But although this factor explains roughly a half of the achieved growth, the 
second half is owed to the deep structural changes and changes in the 
management of privatized enterprises (Subsection 5.3).  In 2000 for the 
first time positive correlation between growth and deepness of privatization 
was observed at least on the cross section of two dozens of sectors 
(Shygayeva, 2001).  It means that even the voucher privatization, 
nonetheless, partly succeeded in the creation of the more active economy 
actors.   
On the other hand, in 1999 after the sound struggle of small businesses’ 
lobby accompanied by strikes, the new simplified system of taxation for 
small businesses was introduced.  It has provided small private enterprises 
and self-employed with the opportunity of considerable reduction of an 
administrative burden in exchange for the higher (on average) payments to 
the budget.  As a result, the revenues from the respective sectors of 
business, like flea market retailers, have grown six-fold in two years. 
While market-oriented sectors demonstrated a sharp growth in 2000, the 
policy of paternalism was attacked by: 
 an improvement of financial discipline, especially in the energy 
sector; 
 acceleration of privatization (privatization revenues reached USD 
383 million in 2000); 
 freezing of the practices of granting tax privileges and the creation 
of new free economic  zones; 
 lowering the volume of the government purchases of  
T-bills on the primary market (the planned volume was fulfilled by 
60 percent); 
 the 9-month external borrowing “holidays”; 
 dissolution of the agricultural collective farms which laid ground for 
a 9.9-percent growth in this sector in 2001; 
 some progress in an administrative reform. 
Such developments, however, could not satisfy appetites of rent-seekers 
who, according to the former First Vice Premier  
Y. Tymoshenko, lost in foregone rents up to UAH 9 billion (USD 1.8 billion).  
She has been dismissed in January 2000, while the destiny of Prime 
Minister Yushchenko was decided three months later. 
Coming back to Figure 6 (Subsection 4.5), we see that the fall in barter was 
strikingly high in Ukraine.  At the end of 2000 barter transactions 
constituted 17.3 percent in Ukraine (8.3 percent in 2001), and about 30 
percent in Russia, that is, in Ukraine it has fallen almost half as much.  
However, in Russia (Gaddy and Ickes, 2001) the sharp devaluation of 
currency per se automatically led to the visible contraction in barter without 
any real restructuring.  It is very important for the primary resource 
exporting economy, like Russia, and is less sound for Ukraine.  This effect 
is directly related to the rate of devaluation that was twice as much in 
Russia.  We may conclude that despite the shock of the August crisis in 
Russia was painful, Ukrainian firms indeed has changed their behavior 
much more significantly than their Russian colleagues did.  Why? 
Here we seem to find an important although indirect evidence for our 
hypothesis of the blessing Ukraine with the exhaustible sources of rents 
that seemed to come to the end in 1998-1999.  In Russia, the default was 
followed by the substantial increase in the oil prices that brought additional 
flows of macro rent for the country, which partly compensated for the 
losses.  Moreover, having extremely cheap (due to the ruble’s devaluation) 
energy and gas, Russian producers of by-products became especially 
competitive, whilst their Ukrainian colleagues having not enjoyed such 
privileges lost.  For Ukraine, the maintaining of low prices for electricity was 
threatened with the energy system crash that finally has made some 
reforms, mainly hardening of the budget constraints, unavoidable.   
The same patterns are observed in other sectors too.  When the state 
stepped aside from the organized subsidized supply of gasoline and other 
oil products for agricultural planting and harvesting, their consumption of 
those products in agriculture halved (Sabluk, 2001).33  Anyway, there is a 
steady lowering of the annual consumption of gas.  For example, 
consumption of this commodity totaled 75 billion cu.m.  and 72.5 billion 
cu.m. in 1999 and 2000, respectively.  During January-August 2001, it fell 
by another 6 percent comparing with the corresponding period of the 
previous year. 
Taking into account the data on electricity and gasoline losses we may 
expect that after the gas market liberalization the annual volume of the 
natural gas consumption would fall from 15 to 50 percent, leading to 
savings from 12 billion cu.m. to 36 billion cu.m.  The money value of 
possible savings could reach USD 1-3 billion (3-9 percent of GDP).  Adding 
the electricity losses (Subsection 3.3), we conclude that by the hardening of 
the budget constraints in the energy sector Ukraine can get saved up to 10 
percent of GDP annually. 
 
Subsection 5.3:  Recent developments 
After the dismissal of Yushchenko, the economy has continued its upward 
trend although the rate of growth began to slow down.  While the GDP 
growth reached 10.8 percent in January-June 2001, it declined to 9.1 
percent in 2001, and 3.8 percent in January-May 2002.   
During the whole year after the appointment, the government headed by 
the Head of the ULIE Mr. A. Kinakh failed to formulate the objectives of the 
economic policy.  One reason for this was a burst of administrative 
bureaucracy and introduction of positions of state secretaries.  The 
government agreed to such administrative innovations having shown the 
lack of political will and strategic vision.  The state bureaucracy even 
worsened: 
• ministers, who were fired for inefficient work returned to the top 
positions in the government; 
• the government is conducting a policy of selective support of 
certain regions, sectors and enterprises; 
• Mr. Kinakh admitted non-readiness of his government to spur 
Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organization and European 
structures; 
• the Ministry for Industrial Policy, a home of paternalism and 
protectionism, has been restored; it announced the ban on 
bankruptcy sales of loss-making enterprises and the decision to 
exercise control over strategic companies. 
                                                 
33  It does not mean, however, that the whole of these 50 percent of a motor fuels were indeed 
lost or wasted; rather the major part of it was stolen or sold by the market price.   
Strange enough, but the international financial organizations, which were 
reluctant to give a hand to the pro-market government headed by 
Yushchenko, have found such a traditional policy quite satisfactory to help 
with new loans.  Having received enough funds from the IFOs, ruling circles 
concentrated on the parliamentary elections in the spring 2002.  They are, 
definitely, not in a hurry to privatize loss-making enterprises, improve a 
financial discipline in the energy sector and carry out the administrative 
reform.  Such a policy conducted by the rent-givers with respect to the 
same rent-takers as in 1994-1999 is questionable and leads to nowhere but 
the preservation of the incumbent ruling circles and withholding of the 
structural reforms 
These developments suggest that recent economic growth is under a threat 
because it seems not to be supported by the selection of less paternalistic 
business entities.   
Using the same IFC survey data we have estimated the probit regressions 
for the indicators of business expansion – growth in revenues (2000 
comparing to 1999) and in investments in 200034 (the Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient between the two is 44 percent) as dependent from 
the business culture (for description of proxies see Subsection 3.4).  We 
have added the Having Subsidies variable that is equal to zero if a firm did 
not have subsidies (in a broad sense, included tax, energy and utility 
arrears) neither in 1999, nor in 2000; 1 – if it took place just in 1999; 2 – if it 
was subsidized just in 2000; 3 – in both years.  Our idea was to assess the 
direction and strength of the business selection (Subsection 3.1) in Ukraine 
as a result of reforms.  The results are presented in Table 15. 
As an evidence for hardening of the budget constraints we have found the 
firms having arrears on average have much lower probability to achieve the 
revenue growth.  We have also found (not reported) the industrial firms’ 
investments to be positively correlated with having profits.  It is consistent 
with Dubrovskiy et al. (2001), who observed (using another set of data) the 
same patterns for investments in 1999, although, the opposite – negative 
relations between investments and a set of indicators for the quality of 
management – were observed in 1998.   
What is encouraging is that the market-oriented culture, including external 
openness, at last has started to widespread with investments.  However, 
we cannot always state the same for the revenue growth.35  The most 
competitive firms, the exporters, certainly make more investments.  Also, 
those firms that have marketing and business planning are investing. 
                                                 
34  Firms reported just the fact that they had growth or made some investments regardless to 
the volume. 
35  For the industrial sector, however, this is also true. 
The impact of the Social Responsibility variable to the growth is rather 
negative despite the fact that it can serve as a proxy for the firm’s viability.  
Thus, Ukraine’s growth in 1999-2000 will be hardly accompanied by the 
same rate of tax revenue growth.  This is exactly the case for 2001.  On the 
other hand, positive signs on the respective coefficients in the investment 
regression may be just owed to the better performance of the firms 
reported higher affordable tax burden.   
But what is really disappointing, no relation is observed between the 
paternalistic attitude and investment.  While the coefficient on arrears is 
negative, the one on the paternalism is positive, although they are 
statistically insignificant.  Also, those firms that have subsidies (both open 
and hidden) have actually even more chances to grow as those that do not 
have them.  It means that the ROP is still in place and the selection is still 
going along the lines of paternalism and the ROP.  Thus, the risk of 
continuing the ROP, including the restoration of SBC to the previous 
(observed prior to 1998 crisis) levels, remains pretty high. 
 
Section 6:  
Assessment of potential for creation of the 
new institutional environment and medium-
term growth 
 
 
There are a few “purely economic” restrictions on the rates of growth for the 
small catching-up economy bordering with the first-wave EU candidates 
and having high transitivity and relatively good infrastructure, as well as 
educated labor force with high potential for creativity.  The major 
restrictions are the political and economic formal and informal institutions.  
Now the controversial tendencies in their evolution, as well as in the 
population and elite behavior are observed.  The new elite will unavoidably 
replace the old nomenklatura due to the natural rotation in a decade, but 
what kind of elite will be this new one?  If it will be blessed by the 
predecessors and follow their traditions of paternalism and closeness, we 
come to the pessimistic scenario.  If, on the other hand, pro-market forces 
will successfully replace the paternalistic ones during the coming elections, 
Ukraine has a chance to approach a steady two-digit growth revealing its 
long-term advantages in creative and skilled human capital.  We believe 
that this is just a question of time for Ukraine to enter the period of steady 
growth, although such an evolution can take a decade or even more.  
During this period the permanent political struggle will make the situation 
unstable and hardly predictable.   
 
Subsection 6.1: Pessimistic scenario: old-minded elite, resource-oriented 
policy 
In the pessimistic scenario the following major conditions are expected to 
prevail: 
• no change in elite selection; 
• resource-oriented policy (supply of inputs, protectionism, credit 
and monetary expansion); 
• marginal and heavily distorted market selection; 
• widespread rents, non-market incentives; 
• external soft budget constraints and rents; 
• possible crash of energy system; devastation of fixed capital; 
• possible default on external debt; 
• the preferred development of energy-intensive sectors based on 
the government’s support. 
The pessimistic way of development of Ukraine’s economy under the old-
minded ruling elite is linked with continuation of the resource-oriented 
policy of soft budget constraints, including: 
• external soft political constraints (multi-vector orientation towards 
the West and Russia simultaneously) with maintaining of 
dependence on Russian energy supplies in exchange for 
political concessions and privileged privatization; 
• soft fiscal policy (further increase of budget and enterprise 
arrears, reliance on Treasury bills and/or Eurobonds, writing-off 
debts, numerous regional and sector privileges); 
• soft monetary policy (the high level of growth of money supply 
at 40-50 percent per year); 
• Belarussian-Romanian-Turkish inflation (30-40 percent per 
year). 
This will allow for the preservation of the existing source of micro rents and 
implies the partial reappearance of the major rent sources being in place 
prior to the 1998 crisis.  It presumes the widespread rent seeking that will 
continue the crowding out of the productive activity across the economy.  
Piecemeal reforms will be conducted only under (primarily, external) 
pressure, and by the minimal possible extent necessary to escape an 
immediate crash. 
Having these rents the authorities will avoid structural changes in the 
economy.  Instead they will persist in trying to revive dead factories 
spending millions of hryvnias without prior marketing and feasibility studies.  
The foreign trade will be directed primarily toward Russia and CIS.  
However, if Russia joins the WTO in 2003, it will add headache for the 
Ukrainian exporters who may suffer additional losses of USD 1-2 billion per 
year.  The share of Russia in foreign trade will increase making Ukraine’s 
economy heavily dependent on the volatile Russian market and producing 
obvious impacts on the foreign policy. 
The structure of foreign trade will remain almost the same and the annual 
imports of the Russian and Turkmen gas will stay at the level of 55-60 billion 
cu. m. or even higher.  It is expected that Russia would pay no more than 10-
15 percent in monetary form  
for the delivery of natural gas through the Ukrainian territory.  The share of 
non-monetary payments and mutual offsets will increase again, although it 
barely can reach its incredible rate of 1997-1998. 
The dual balance (the budget balance and balance of the current account) 
would worsen.  The budget deficit will go up to 7-10 percent of GDP.  The 
foreign reserves of the National Bank of Ukraine will fluctuate at the level of 
three-week imports. 
The selective (special) approach for certain groups of taxpayers will not 
stimulate other enterprises to demonstrate profitability.  The real budget 
revenues will go down, resulting in the deterioration of infrastructure; and 
authorities will rely on the “traditional” methods of covering budget deficit 
through the domestic Treasury bills, new wage arrears, external borrowing 
from the IFOs and Russia at high rates and/or at the expense of further 
concessions of aircraft, ships, information space, etc. 
The domestic and foreign business circles will not welcome such a 
“traditional” policy.  Evolution of the administrative control system will lead 
to the powering of executive branch, especially of its most bribe-intensive 
divisions, and sluggishness in strategic planning resulting in the decreasing 
government’s capability.  The high level of government interference in the 
economy will preserve high risks for doing business in Ukraine.   
The loose fiscal and monetary policy will result in the depreciation of the 
national currency, which will follow the inflation caused by the increase of 
money supply by 40-50 percent every year.  Combined with rising import 
restrictions it will lead to the appreciation of the real exchange rate not 
related to the increase in the economy’s competitiveness, which will further 
hurt the latter.   
However, expansionary policy will inevitably fail in the transitional economy 
with weak institutional environment due to: 
• Inefficient bureaucracy; 
• Widespread “special” relationships between politicians and big 
business; 
• Corruption. 
Although this kind of policy will come to an end sooner or later, the situation 
with human and health capital high raises concerns.  Without sound 
improvements in the social and wage policy, rule of law, human rights, etc., 
the most dynamic and educated people will emigrate.  Only in 2000 more 
than 800 Ph.D. holders left the country.  The problem of the high rate of the 
AIDS dissemination exacerbates the situation.  By some estimates, the 
number of HIV-positive patients reached 280,000 and is going up.   
All in all, Ukraine’s economy will return on track of a slow albeit steady 
decline. 
 
Subsection 6.2:  Baseline: a dual economy 
In the baseline scenario the following major conditions are expected to 
dominate: 
• slow replacement of the old elite by more competent 
professionals; 
• limited, slowly shrinking rents concentrated in a few sectors 
with restricted access;  
• shrinking external soft budget constraints; 
• growth in the labor-intensive no-rent sectors with stagnation in 
the energy-intensive rent-oriented ones; 
• domination of the incentive-oriented policy, both market-
oriented (HBC for most of the economy; slow improvement in 
taxation and legislation business framework) and activist 
industrial policy. 
The baseline scenario is based on somewhat stricter monetary policy and 
fiscal policy.  Discretionary resource-oriented policy will continue, although 
at a lesser magnitude.  Slowly shrinking sources of rents, particularly non-
monetary payments and mutual offsets, will be limited within certain sectors 
of economy.  The ruling circles will somewhat harden the budget 
constraints, hence allowing market forces to operate more freely.  
However, protection of domestic producers will remain priority #1 and will 
be conducted through the case-by-case considerations, meaning personal 
meetings between producers and the Prime Minister, government 
interference in the economy in favor of certain regions, sectors, or even 
specific enterprises (tax loopholes or free economic (actually, offshore) 
zones).  The government will rely on the policy of the external borrowing 
from the international financial organizations and sales of attractive 
enterprises undergoing privatization to the Russian investors.  The ruling 
circles will support the idea of further expansion of the Russian capital into 
Ukraine and the creation of the Russian-Ukrainian industrial-financial 
groups.   
However, the external financing will be wasted without any visible 
improvement in the economy.  Instead, the burden of external debt 
servicing will re-appear again and a threat of default will become imminent.  
The authorities will fall into the budget deficit trap once again although it is 
expected not to be very dramatic  
(3-5 percent of GDP). 
Some cosmetic administrative reforms under external pressure could be 
expected.  However, it would not prevent ruling circles from their 
“correction” and the return to the traditional Ministries or increased 
bureaucracy under the new names. 
The pressure for devaluation of the hryvnia will not be so strong but 10-15 
percent annual depreciation looks plausible.  The investment crisis will further 
deepen.  A number of new investment projects will be stalled. 
The budget will continue to suffer losses from gas and oil traders, who 
remain reluctant to paying taxes for the transit of natural gas through the 
Ukrainian territory. 
The government, headed by representatives of basic sectors, will conduct 
an industrial policy, which means the government monopoly and absence 
of a competitive environment in favor of energy-inefficient sectors (ferrous 
metallurgy, coal sector, fuels and electricity) and some favored engineering 
plants.  However, the new market-oriented sectors will somewhat 
strengthen their positions due to better management and attraction of the 
more qualified Western-trained specialists. 
Due to slow implementation of the reforms in agriculture this sector will 
remain highly vulnerable to external shocks although from time to time it 
will demonstrate some positive results. 
Imports of natural gas from the CIS due to the moderate implementation of 
energy-saving technologies will go down to  
45-50 billion cu. m.  The share of monetary payments for the transit of the 
Russian gas through the Ukrainian territory will stabilize at the level of 30-
35 percent. 
The foreign reserves of the National Bank of Ukraine will reach the level of 
six-week imports. 
The growth will be on average pretty slow (2-3 percent annually) and highly 
volatile. 
 
Subsection 6.3:  Optimistic scenario: revealing the long-term competitive 
advantages 
In the optimistic scenario the following major conditions are expected to 
prevail: 
• Quick changes in elite selection, arrival of market-oriented 
professionals; 
• tough restrictions on and elimination of the major rent sources, 
• policy with the emphasis on the right market incentives and actors’ 
selection (fiscal, monetary, institutional policies), as well as social 
safety net development; 
• development of the sophisticated labor-intensive sectors;  
• rapid growth of small high-tech companies and subsidiaries of 
the multinationals with increase of exports of intellectual 
services and products; 
• fast expansion of the financial sector. 
According to this scenario, the pro-market forces will win elections in the 
spring 2002 and forthcoming Presidential elections in 2004.  They will 
initiate and expand the policy of structural changes in the economy by, first 
of all, attacking the remnants of the non-monetary means of payments.  
The increase in money supply will exceed the rate of GDP growth, but not 
significantly, at 10-15 percent.  It will manifest itself in a rising money 
demand, further monetization of the economy and strengthening of the 
national currency, which will: 
• neutralize inflationary expectations,  
• send signals for structural transformations,  
• lower income and real exchange rate volatility, 
• help to remonetize the economy,  
• stimulate the balanced economic policy, and  
• weaken the “special” relationships in the Ukrainian economy.   
The policy of enhancement of the fiscal discipline will lead to a further 
increase of the budget revenues, successful fulfillment of the government 
obligations (first and foremost, elimination of wage, pension and other 
arrears), and, consequently, some improvement of the living standards of 
population.  At the same time, it will restrict rent seeking.   
The number of Western-educated and market-trained Ukrainians returning 
back to Ukraine will steadily grow, which will significantly improve the 
quality of management (including the governmental one), products and 
services.  Foreign companies will come to Ukraine to employ the human 
capital in high tech and IT; hence increasing exports of high-skilled 
services.  The Ukrainian modern manufacturing will undergo deep 
restructuring and, augmented with better management, will become 
internationally competitive. 
The government will keep the positive balance of the current account.  This 
policy is attractive due to a number of factors: 
• Inexpediency of increase of the external debt; 
• Non-inflationary stimulation of the purchasing parity power of 
population; 
• Strengthening of expectations of price and monetary stability; 
• Stimulation of a technology transfer; 
• Specialization based on comparative advantages. 
The government will clearly declare the Euro-Atlantic priority in the foreign 
policy, which would be supported by the OECD investors.  The dismissal of 
corrupted officials and elimination of the “compromising” structures will 
improve the playing field for economic actors.   
Support of the positive balance of the current account does not mean the 
artificial restrictions on imports.  On the contrary, exports will be considered 
as one of the main driving force of economic growth and its development will 
have domestic roots such as a need in technological modernization, 
improvement of marketing on the external markets, and structural changes.  
The export taxes will be minimized and the low unified import duty will be set 
up for all imported goods without any exceptions.  Ukraine will join the WTO, 
CEFTA and some other regional trade agreements in 2003-2004. 
After the further price liberalization and cancellation of subsidies on rent 
and utilities, transition to floating prices on the major goods, namely, natural 
gas, oil, wheat, etc., the authorities will conduct a policy of curbing inflation 
down to an average Central European 4-6 percent per year. 
The government will continue the policy of reduction and restructuring of 
the external debt.  The need in external borrowing will disappear.  The 
sustainable maintaining of the positive budget balance is necessary for 
lowering of the banking rates and the spread between the lending and 
deposit rates.  In this case the banking lending rates in hryvnias will fall to 
the “normal transitional” 15-20 percent and the spread will not exceed 8-9 
percent.  Another precondition for that – strengthening of property rights – 
will also take place due to the government’s abstinence from discretionary 
policy. 
The pro-market leadership will spur further privatization of enterprises.  The 
number of privatized enterprises will rise to 100 000 by 2005 from the 
current 82 000 ones in the middle of 2002. 
The government will diversify energy supplies focusing on domestic 
production of oil and gas as well as imports of gas from the Western 
Europe (the Netherlands and Norway) and oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
and Middle East.  At the same time the energy-saving technologies and 
meter systems will be implemented, which would help to reduce the overall 
consumption of energy by 20 percent.  The structural changes in favor of 
low energy-intensive industries will reduce this consumption further. 
Imports of natural gas from the CIS due to faster implementation of energy-
saving technologies will fall to 35-40 billion cu. m.  The share of monetary 
payments for transit of the Russian gas through the Ukrainian territory will go 
up to the level of 60-65 percent and even higher. 
The system of private land ownership will be implemented and agriculture 
will start to grow quite rapidly at a 10-15 percent rate per year. 
The foreign reserves of the National Bank of Ukraine will exceed the level 
of three-month imports. 
In our opinion, after removing the main institutional barriers, Ukraine can 
achieve two-digit rates of growth.  
 
Section 7: 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
We have examined Ukraine’s transition for the last decade.  What are the 
main lessons to be drawn from our analysis?  
First, the role of selection of the economy actors, both managers and policy 
makers, is really crucial.  Government officials and their privileged business 
partners, once being incorporated into the “elite” under certain institutional 
arrangement, become the carriers of this, often destructive for a society as a 
whole, arrangement through time.  The way they adjust to the new conditions 
is heavily path dependent.  In fact, the new elite was very successful in 
supporting the old institutional arrangements as soon as possible institutional 
changes could be potentially subversive for its rent seeking habits.  The 
Ukrainian elite of the Soviet era was formed under the tradition of 
overconfidence in the inexhaustible resources that allowed Soviet leaders to 
delay reforms for decades.  Being equipped with the old-minded and rent 
seeking leaders, the Ukrainian government of 1990s has discovered a “soft” 
external borrowing as a substitute for the “macro” rent it has been addicted to 
before.  It has used the flows of funds from the T-bills market and external 
borrowing as a substitute for reforms.  This is the way the D.  North’s “path 
dependence” has worked in Ukraine. 
There is also a microeconomic mechanism behind the reluctance to 
reforms.  In the case of Ukraine the micro rent seeking plays the crucial 
role in the preservation of the resource-oriented policy and creation of the 
virtual macro rents.  As soon as the government remains resource-
oriented, it propagates the rent seeking culture.  The availability of macro 
rents strengthens the nomenklatura’s “grabbing hand” and results in the 
highly unfavorable conditions, especially for the new businesses.  
Consequently, instead of the “creative destruction” Ukraine ended up with 
“implicit destruction”, manifested in the high hidden unemployment, brain 
drain, wage and pension arrears, etc.  The paternalistic attitude of the 
public allows the ruling circles to play a dirty game of extracting rents. 
The second lesson is that due to historical reasons, institutional problems 
are deeply rooted.  There is no way to change mentality of decision makers 
overnight, although there is a way to alleviate its economic consequences, 
which is to arrange the market-driven selection of less paternalistic 
personalities.  But to do this, the government and the public should agree 
on the non-paternalistic environment for the business and politics.  Is there 
any escape from this vicious circle? 
The third lesson is that the elimination of the external sources of macro 
rent, and the external hard budget constraints, can help.  Just like the 
exhaustion of a macro rent has pushed ex-USSR to reforms in the mid-
1980s, the end of the “virtual” macro rent has pushed Ukraine to reforms in 
1998-2001.  The positive experience of 2000 has demonstrated that the 
major restrictions for Ukraine’s economic development are of the 
institutional nature, indeed.  With less resources but harder budget 
constraints after the attack on non-monetary payments the economy 
started to show signs of revival.   
Privatization facilitated although a slow, but steady transition of Ukraine’s 
economy to the market tracks.  It contributed to an increase of industrial 
output, with the highest rates of growth being achieved in the most privatized 
sectors of industry.  Dissolution of the former collective farms led to positive 
results in agriculture.  Despite all bureaucratic obstacles from the most 
conservative forces the institutional factor of reforming property relations 
became the leading driving force for taking economy out of the crisis.   
Another potential factor of growth is fast assimilation of knowledge and 
skills, as well as availability of a start-up capital earned by millions of 
Ukrainians working abroad.  Along with some simplification of taxation for 
small businesses (that was achieved under a public pressure) it has led to 
the expansion of the least paternalistic sector of small start-ups.   
The fourth lesson is that understanding of Ukrainian transition experience 
should not be attempted relying on the purely economic reasoning.  The 
problems experienced by Ukraine certainly have a very strong political 
flavor.  The fact that the most reform-oriented government over the 1990s 
was promptly dismissed by the Parliament serves as a good confirmation of 
that.  Unfortunately, Ukrainian elite is still weak and highly paternalistic, and 
this feature has strong historical roots.  Here the “path dependence” is 
again in force.   
Nevertheless, a number of factors allow us to state that the political 
economy situation in Ukraine is probably better than that in Russia.  We 
foretell that a long-term trend will favor Ukraine since she has less profound 
sources of rents that are expected to be exhausted earlier.  The short- and 
medium-term developments, however, depend heavily on the upcoming 
shifts in the economic and political elite.  If the positive changes come 
soon, before the human capital substantially deteriorates, and if they are 
radical enough, Ukraine has a good chance to achieve two-digit rates of 
growth.   
 
